Pages

Thursday, April 30, 2015

No action taken on information based on notice of writ petition

A disturbing feature of this case is that even after notice of the writ petition when the State of Haryana became aware that Khub Ram lacked essential qualification and his certificates were unreliable, it took no action to undo the ill effects of fraud by taking any action against Khub Ram. As a result Khub Ram continued in service for a number of years and also earned promotions. This was at the cost of claim of other genuine selected candidates whose cases could have been considered if action had been taken at appropriate time.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2734 OF 2012

Khub Ram …..Appellant
Versus
Dalbir Singh & Ors. …..Respondents

W I T H
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4097 OF 2015
[Arising out of S.L.P.(C)No.15871 of 2012]

Mahavir Prasad …..Appellant
Versus
Dalbir Singh & Ors. …..Respondents

J U D G M E N T: SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J.

1.    The Civil Appeal and the Special Leave Petition have been heard together because claim of the parties is in respect of same post of Chief Inspector in the Haryana Roadways to which the appellant - Khub Ram was initially appointed in the year 1990 pursuant to his selection in response to advertisement dated 07.05.1989. First respondent – Dalbir Singh challenged the selection and appointment of appellant Khub Ram by filing C.W.P. No.12711 of 1992 in the High Court. That writ petition was allowed on 01.10.2010 by a learned Single Judge. Not only the appointment of Khub Ram and one more person was quashed but a direction was also issued to appoint writ petitioner – Dalbir Singh from a retrospective date with all consequential benefits. Appellant’s appeal before the Division Bench was dismissed by the impugned order. The petitioner of S.L.P. – Mahavir Prasad has sought permission to file the Special Leave Petition against judgment of learned Single Judge as well as of Division Bench on the ground that he is one amongst the selected candidates and has a better claim for appointment than respondent – Dalbir Singh and hence order should be passed for appointing him in place of Khub Ram. This judgment shall govern both the matters which involve common issues of facts and law.

2.    Permission to file Special Leave Petition (C) No.15871 of 2012 is granted. Delay condoned. Leave granted.

3.    For the sake of convenience the facts have been noticed mainly from the records of Civil Appeal No.2734 of 2012 except where indicated otherwise. For deciding the two issues arising in these cases it is not necessary to go deeper into the facts except to notice that as per terms of advertisement dated 07.05.1989, besides a Degree of Graduation and Hindi upto Matriculation level and age qualification of 17-35 years, it was essential for the candidate to have two years’ experience in Government/Semi-government or Public Undertakings and Roadways Fleet. The appellant’s selection was questioned in the writ petition mainly on the ground that he did not possess the requisite experience and the two certificates submitted by him were from private transporters. There were strong arguments advanced against the selection of appellant and some others on the allegation that political influence had been exercised in their favour and it was specifically pleaded that the appellant was selected in the second round of selection as he belonged to village of the then Chief Minister. The learned Single Judge noticed that appellant’s experience certificates showed that he had worked with a private Bus Service from June 1986 to June 1988 as a Field Staff (Checker) for two years and also with another private roadways as Assistant Manager between 01.09.1984 to 10.03.1987. The courts below noticed that both the certificates contradicted each other because between June 1986 to 10.03.1987 the appellant as per his certificates had worked in two different capacities with two different private bus service. The court also found that the two years’ experience as per terms of the advertisement could not be satisfied by showing experience of working with private transporters as they were not covered by the expression ‘Government/Semi-government or Public Undertakings and Roadways Fleet’.

4.    On behalf of Mahavir Prasad it has been pleaded that the Select List contained names of 14 persons which included Khub Ram and Ram Niwas Rathi whose appointments were quashed by the learned Single Judge as well as name of appellant – Mahavir Prasad but not that of first respondent – Dalbir Singh. On account of his place in the Select List Mahavir Prasad represented for appointment and ultimately filed a writ petition for that purpose bearing C.W.P. No.17600 of 1991 but no relief was given to him by the final order dated 04.08.1992 which for some reason was challenged by the State of Haryana before the Division Bench but not by Mahavir Prasad. But when he learnt that respondent – Dalbir Singh has succeeded in getting a judgment against Khub Ram and a direction for his own appointment, Mahavir Prasad chose to challenge those judgments in favour of Dalbir Singh by preferring the Special Leave Petition directly in this Court and the same was tagged for hearing along with the Civil Appeal.

5.    On behalf of appellant - Khub Ram, Mr. P.N. Misra, Sr. Advocate raised a strong objection that writ petition should not have been allowed in 2010 in view of delay in impleading the appellant as late as in 2004 when he had already earned a promotion on 01.03.1996 and a second promotion as Traffic Manager on 05.05.2000. It was also highlighted that because of interim order of this Court he has continued in service and has been promoted as General Manager in December 2014. He pointed out that objection was taken to the impleadment application dated 16.02.2004 on grounds of delay as well as promotion already earned by the appellant. In support of the aforesaid plea reliance was placed on judgment of this Court in the case of Jiten Kumar Sahoo v. Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. (2011) 11 SCC 520 and in the case of Buddhi Nath Chaudhary v. Abahi Kumar (2001) 3 SCC 328.

6.    Learned senior counsel Mr. Misra also submitted that experience in private roadways fleet would meet the requirement of advertisement if the word ‘and’ appearing before the ‘Roadways Fleet’ is understood and treated as ‘or’. According to him, now when the appellant - Khub Ram has worked for long years, he cannot be denied continuance in service for lack of minimum experience at the stage of recruitment. He further pointed that the appellant noticed the error in experience certificate dated 05.06.1989 relating to experience of two years in Shyam Bus Service from June 1986 to June 1988 and therefore he obtained a corrected certificate on the next day, i.e., 06.06.1989 showing such experience to be from June 1987 to June 1988. According to the appellant, the corrected experience certificate dated 06.06.1989 is on record as Annexure P-2.

7.    In reply, Mr. Vikas Singh, Sr. Advocate for first respondent has pointed out that issue of delay in impleading the appellant as a respondent in the writ petition was not argued before the learned  Single Judge or before the Division Bench. He pointed out that in respect of two years of working experience in paragraph 2 of the writ petition it was claimed that the experience required was of working in a Government or semi-government department and such claim was admitted by the State, second respondent in para 2 of its reply. It was also shown that the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench have returned concurrent findings that the appellant – Khub Ram did not meet the experience qualification and not only his certificates were from private bus operators but also the same were untrustworthy because of apparent conflict and overlapping of a particular period in both the certificates.

8.    Anticipating the arguments on behalf of appellant – Mahavir Prasad in the light of pleadings in the appeal filed by him, Mr. Vikas Singh, learned senior counsel for first respondent highlighted that no other claimant for the post joined the litigation when first respondent preferred the connected writ petition in the year 1992 and even till 2010 when the writ petition was allowed, no other candidate came forward with a rival claim and in such circumstances writ court  committed no error in directing for appointment of first respondent as a consequence of setting aside the appointment of appellant – Khub Ram and another person.

9.    Before adverting to the claims of first respondent and similar claim of appellant – Mahavir Prasad for appointment to the post held by the appellant – Khub Ram, it would be appropriate to first examine the merit of appeal preferred by appellant – Khub Ram. We have carefully looked into the averments made in the writ petition, the reply filed by State and other respondents as well as the judgment of the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench. We find no good  reason to take a different view in respect of the finding that the appellant lacked the essential qualification of experience because his experience certificates were only from private bus operators. It is also found that even the alleged corrected certificate said to be dated 06.06.1989 contained in Annexure P-2 is an unreliable document inasmuch as the date 06.06.1989 is clearly a subsequent correction without any authorization by way of counter signature and so is the case with the words and letters ‘June 1987’ which have been altered subsequently by converting ‘1986’ to ‘1987’. Even after such unauthorized corrections the total experience as per last line of the certificate remains two years. Had the concerned Bus Service issued a fresh corrected certificate then the experience from June 1987 to June 1988 could not have been certified to be experience for two years. The list of dates also has been subsequently corrected to show the date of experience certificate, Annexure P-2 as 06.06.1989 in place of 05.06.1989. This appears to have been done at the instance of the appellant to justify his stand and apparently a bogus claim that he had obtained a correct certificate on the very next date when he found mistakes in the certificates dated 05.06.1989. Had this been the case, there was no occasion for submission of the certificate dated 05.06.1989 with his application which issue has been discussed in detail by the learned Single Judge.

10.        Had the appellant not committed such acts for obtaining selection and appointment, we could have considered the issue of delay as well as judgments supporting such a claim. However, Mr. Patwalia has rightly submitted that delay in impleading the appellant could not weigh with this Court when a case of fraudulent entry into service has been found by the learned Single Judge as well as Division Bench and an attempt has been made by the appellant even to mislead this Court by producing Annexure P-2 and claiming it to be copy of the corrected certificate freshly issued on 06.06.1989. Such conduct of the appellant in our considered view disentitles the appellant – Khub Ram to get any relief under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Patwalia has rightly placed reliance to support the aforesaid submissions, on a judgment of this Court in the case of Meghmala v. G. Narasimha Reddy (2010) 8 SCC 383. The law relating to effect of fraud upon a competent authority to get an appointment/office as well as effect of fraud upon court has been discussed in detail in paragraphs 28 to 36 of the said judgment with which we are in respectful agreement. As a result, we hold that the appellant – Khub Ram is not entitled to hold the office which he obtained by submitting questionable certificates of experience and more so when he lacked the essential qualification of working experience in a Government/Semi-government/Public Sector Undertaking. Hence his appeal is dismissed.

11.        The next question is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the direction of the High Court to appoint first respondent from a retrospective date along with consequential benefits deserves to be upheld or not, particularly when a strong challenge has been made to such direction through a Special Leave Petition of Mahavir Prasad. On this issue Mr. Patwalia, learned senior advocate appearing for Mahavir Prasad has shown from the pleadings that while Mahavir Prasad was at serial no.9 of the Select List containing 14 names prepared for appointment to 5 advertised posts, first respondent Dalbir Singh did not find any place in such Select List. This fact  escaped the attention of learned Single Judge as well as Division Bench possibly because there was no rival claimant to point out such shortcoming in the case of writ petitioner – Dalbir Singh.

12.        Mr. Patwalia has shown from the supplementary affidavit filed in the Special Leave Petition to support the application for condonation of delay, that as far back as on 25.08.1993 the High Court had passed an order in the writ petition directing the writ petitioner to implead the selected candidates (emphasis added) who are likely to be affected by the result of the present writ petition. The writ petitioner was given liberty to file an application for early hearing after impleading the affected party. The writ petitioner filed the impleadment application only for adding Khub Ram and one another person and did not implead all the selected candidates. As a result appellant – Mahavir Prasad was denied the opportunity of contesting the claim of the writ petitioner by placing the relevant correct facts particularly the fact that Dalbir Singh was not a selected candidate.

13.        A number of judgments including State of Mysore v. K.N. Chandrasekhara AIR 1965 SC 532 and R.S. Mittal v. Union of India 1995 Supp. (2) SCC 230 were relied upon by Mr. Patwalia in support of his submission that if challenge to an appointment succeeds, the court will direct for appointment against consequent vacancy only as per the merit list prepared for the purpose of such appointment. The list has to be given due weightage unless the court has proceeded to quash the Select List itself. Since the proposition is well founded in law and there is no caveat on this issue, there is no need to discuss the case law on the subject in any detail.

14.        Learned counsel for the State of Rajasthan has submitted that Khub Ram was ineligible for want of a requisite experience and hence by working on the post as claimed by him for subsequent two years he cannot get the required eligibility. He placed reliance upon a judgment of this Court in the case of Central Bank of India v. Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir (2008) 13 SCC 170. That judgment was rendered in a case where the caste certificate which was the basis for claiming and getting appointment was found to be false. The court, in the facts of the case held the action of the applicant concerned to be fraudulent and on that basis, after discussing the relevant case law in detail in paragraphs 15, 16 and 17, declined to endorse the lenient view taken by the High Court and instead, upheld the order of termination of service of the concerned employee with a sound reasoning - “the selection of the employee was conceived in deceit and, therefore, could not be saved by equitable considerations”.  According to learned counsel for the State Dalbir Singh did not find place in the list of selected candidates and hence it would not be proper to uphold the direction for his appointment and if Mahavir’s claim finds favour then the authority concerned may be directed to consider the claim of all selected candidates including that of Mahavir Prasad but only against original post, if available. The appointment  should not be ordered from any retrospective date or with any consequential benefits.

15.        There is no dispute that first respondent – Dalbir Singh was only an applicant and was not among the selected 14 candidates. In that view of the matter, the High Court was misled to issue a direction for his appointment and that too from an earlier date when Khub Ram  was appointed, and with consequential benefits. Such directions could not have been issued without considering the claims of other persons in the Select List. For that reason, the directions issued in favour of first respondent are set aside. To that extent, appeal of Mahavir Prasad has to be allowed. However, the other prayer made on behalf of Mahavir Prasad that authorities be directed to offer him appointment or consider his claim, in our considered view cannot be allowed on account of the fact that writ petition of Mahavir Prasad filed in 1991 was decided against him by order dated 04.08.1992 passed in C.W.P.No.17600 of 1991. Rightly or wrongly the High Court  held that he could not claim any right of appointment on account of a place in the Select List. That judgment attained finality. Mahavir  Prasad chose not to appeal against that order nor he challenged the appointment of any of the persons selected and appointed. His claim  thus suffers from res judicata as well as acquiescence and estoppel. In that view of the matter and also for the reason that a long period of more than 25 years has passed since the preparation of the Select List, in our view it would be inappropriate to grant any relief which may require the authorities to examine the claim of persons in the Select List for appointment to the original post which may not even be available after lapse of so many years. We have been told that Mahavir is presently about 50 years of age and has not crossed the age of superannuation and is still working on another post with Haryana Roadways. That in our opinion, will not change the relevant factors indicated above. Hence we are not persuaded to grant any further relief to Mahavir Prasad and his appeal is allowed only in part  as a result whereof the direction to appoint first respondent – Dalbir  Singh is set aside.

16.        A disturbing feature of this case is that even after notice of the writ petition when the State of Haryana became aware that Khub Ram lacked essential qualification and his certificates were unreliable, it took no action to undo the ill effects of fraud by taking any action against Khub Ram. As a result Khub Ram continued in service for a number of years and also earned promotions. This was at the cost of claim of other genuine selected candidates whose cases could have been considered if action had been taken at appropriate time. In such a situation, although we have granted no relief to Mahavir Prasad by ordering for his appointment, we direct the State of Haryana to compensate Mahavir Prasad by paying him an amount of Rs.3,00,000/- (Rupees Three Lacs) within two months. A further amount of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lac) should also be deposited by the State of Haryana with the Supreme Court Mediation Centre within the same time. The State of Haryana would be at liberty to fix responsibility as to who was at fault for not taking action in the matter after the deceitful acts came to its knowledge through filing of  the writ petition in 1992, and if possible, to recover the aforesaid  amount of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lacs) from the concerned persons, in accordance with law, if they are still in office.

17.        As discussed above, Civil Appeal No.2734 of 2012 is dismissed  and the other Civil Appeal arising out of S.L.P.(C)No.15871 of 2012 is allowed only to the extent indicated above. There shall be no further order as to costs.

......………………...……………………………….J.
[FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA]
……………………………………………………….J.
[SHIVA KIRTI SINGH]
New Delhi.

April 29, 2015

Monday, April 27, 2015

Abuse from an spouse “as being born from a prostitute is a cruelty.”

If a spouse abuses the other as being born from a prostitute, this cannot be termed as “wear and tear” of family life. Summoning the police on false or flimsy grounds cannot also be similarly viewed. Making it impossible for any close relatives to visit or reside in the matrimonial home would also indubitably result in cruelty to the other spouse.                                              (Para 7)

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 5511-5512 OF 2014

VINOD KUMAR SUBBIAH .…..APPELLANTS
Versus
SARASWATHI PALANIAPPAN …..RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T: VIKRAMAJIT SEN,J.

1.      These Appeals assail the Judgment of the learned Single Judge of theHigh Court of Judicature at Madras, Bench at Madurai, delivered on  13.3.2013, setting aside the Judgment dated 25.8.2011 of the Trial Court. The Impugned Judgment dismissed the divorce petition filed by the Appellant.

2.      The Appellant and the Respondent were married on 28.6.2004 and moved to the U.S. on 9.7.2004. They visited Chennai in October 2005 and June 2006. During the latter visit, the Respondent was three months pregnant and left for her parental home in Madurai on 10.6.2006 where she gave birth to a male child on 5.12.2006. The Appellant subsequently filed for divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act on 30.4.2007.

3.      The case put forward by the Appellant is that the Respondent was verbally abusive; she would insult his family; she would threaten to lodge false police complaints; and she would threaten to commit suicide placing the blame on the Appellant and his family. After she left for her parental home in June 2006, the Appellant attempted to bring her back to her matrimonial home but she refused. The Appellant claims that he has been put through intolerable mental agony and can no longer continue to be married to the Respondent.

4.      The Respondent denied these allegations and claimed that she and the Appellant lived happily in the U.S., and she only went to her parental home in June 2006 for her child to be born there. She has pleaded that she returned to Chennai with her child from March to April 2007, that the divorce petition was completely unexpected and was the result of a misunderstanding between her family and that of the Appellant. She subsequently filed a petition seeking restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, praying that the Appellant be directed to take her back to her conjugal home, which she pleaded is in the U.S. She alleged that her husband is living a wayward life, that her father-in-law misbehaved with her, and that her parents-in-law were negligent with her infant child and asked her to leave the house when she questioned them about this. She also filed a maintenance petition seeking Rs. 2 lakhs per month as maintenance.

5.      The Trial Court heard all three petitions together and examined the evidence submitted by the parties at length. The Appellant has deposed that when his sister came to the U.S., she initially stayed with him and the Respondent. However, the Respondent did not like having her in the house, so she locked the Respondent and his sister out of the house, was abusive towards them and told them that they belonged to a “prostitute family”. Eventually the Appellant’s sister was constrained to stay at a Lodge. The Respondent claimed that the dispute was because her sister-in-law tried to make her join her diamond business, which she did not want to do. The Trial Court found no truth in the argument of the Respondent, in light of the fact that she has no background or knowledge of the diamond business. Furthermore, the Appellant has deposed that when his brother came to the U.S. to study, he also initially stayed at the Appellant’s house. However, it is in evidence that the Respondent called the Appellant at work alleging that his brother was knocking on her door, thus implying that he was behaving in an untoward manner. She abused the Appellant and his family in the presence of his brother and threatened to file a police complaint. The Appellant has deposed that he was forced to make his brother stay elsewhere. In a subsequent event, the Appellant informed the Respondent that his parents would be coming to the U.S. The Respondent was verbally and physically abusive, and called the police alleging domestic violence. The Appellant was given a warning by the Police. The Respondent claimed that the incident took place because the Appellant was having an affair with a woman named Solai. She claimed that he took her to Solai’s house that evening and then wanted to go back at night, which is why she called the police. The Trial Court has justifiably highlighted that summoning the police was serious because the Appellant was in a foreign country and didn’t know the laws and procedure. Further, the allegation that he was having an affair was not accepted, as it was unbelievable that the Respondent had previously not told anyone about Solai and further that it never came up du ring the attempted compromise between the families of the two parties. The Respondent claimed that after having the child, she came to live with the Appellant, which the Appellant denied. The Respondent also alleged that while she was living with the Appellant’s family, his parents took the child who was only three months old away for six hours. By the time they brought him back, he was unconscious due to starvation. When the Respondent questioned them about this, they asked her to leave the house with the child, even though it was late in the night. The Trial Court found this allegation entirely unbelievable. Her allegation that the father of the Appellant started misbehaving with her and went to the extent of pulling her hands was also found to be false. The Trial Court also took into consideration the voice mails and emails from the Respondent to the Appellant, which were not treated as the main evidence but as evidence intended to substantiate the oral evidence. It was held that the evidence and the submissions of the Respondent indicate that she was unwilling to live in the Appellant’s house in Chennai, and that she wanted him to leave his family in India and live in the U.S. with her. It is pertinent to note that the Appellant had lost his job in the U.S. and was unemployed and consequently had to set up residence in Chennai. In light of these circumstances, it was found that the Respondent is not entitled to conjugal rights. An order of dissolution of marriage was passed and maintenance was fixed at Rs. 25,000 per month.

6.      The High Court, however, held that the Appellant’s allegations in his divorce petition were no more than “the ordinary wear and tear” that takes place in a marriage. It observed that the Appellant did not give details of the events of abuse by the Respondent towards his family or the cruelty that was meted out to him in the U.S. in his main petition or his subsequent counter affidavits. It was only after filing the petition that the Appellant had produced copies of the abusive voicemails and emails he received from the Respondent. The High Court noted that the Trial Court did not need to strictly adhere to hard and fast rules while entertaining evidence, but nevertheless held that the Trial Court had acted in haste in allowing the Appellant’s allegations. The High Court found that the Trial Court, instead of considering whether the Appellant had established cruelty by adducing evidence, took certain answers from the Respondent’s Chief examination and cross-examination out of context and held that a case of cruelty was made out. The High Court stated that in a matrimonial relationship, parties must be prepared to subject themselves to the normal wear and tear of life, and that the situation at hand was no more than that. The divorce petition was thus dismissed and the petition for restitution of conjugal rights was allowed.

7.      We have carefully considered the matter, and find that we are unable to uphold the conclusions of the High Court. The Appellant had duly pleaded instances of mental cruelty which he proved in evidence and documents. An examination of the divorce petition makes it abundantly clear that various allegations of cruelty were made out and a number of incidents were mentioned therein. Further evidence was submitted during the course of the Trial to substantiate these allegations, which is in keeping with Order VI Rule 2 of the CPC. Furthermore, we find that the Trial Court examined the evidence at great length and came to the reasoned conclusion that the actions of the Respondent amounted to cruelty. If a spouse abuses the other as being born from a prostitute, this cannot be termed as “wear and tear” of family life. Summoning the police on false or flimsy grounds cannot also be similarly viewed. Making it impossible for any close relatives to visit or reside in the matrimonial home would also indubitably result in cruelty to the other spouse. After a cursory discussion of the evidence which the Trial Court had discussed threadbare, the High Court was not justified to set aside the conclusions arrived at by the Trial Court without giving substantiated reasons.

8.      We thus allow these Appeals and set aside the Impugned Order, but desist from imposing costs. The Trial Court’s decision granting dissolution of the marriage between the parties is hereby restored.

9.      We allow the Respondent’s Application for disbursement of the amount
deposited by the Appellant towards her legal expenses in pursuance of the Order dated 4.7.2013.
.................................................J.
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN]
…….............................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
New Delhi;

April 24, 2015.

Monday, April 20, 2015

Mutation in revenue records does not create title

Mutation of a property in the revenue record does not create or extinguish title nor has it any presumptive value on title. It only enables the person in whose favour mutation is ordered to pay the land revenue in question. The learned Additional District Judge was wholly in error in coming to a conclusion that mutation in favour of Inder Kaur conveys title in her favour. This erroneous conclusion has vitiated the entire judgment.                                   (Para 9)

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 3725-3726 OF 2015
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 3377-3378 of2011]

H. Lakshmaiah Reddy & Ors.                                            .. Appellants
-vs-
L. Venkatesh Reddy                                                        .. Respondent

J U D G M E N T: C. NAGAPPAN, J.

1.     Leave granted.

2.      These appeals are preferred against judgment dated 8.9.2010 in R.S.A. No.1500 of 2009 by which the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore allowed the Second Appeal filed by the respondent herein and against the final order dated 25.11.2010 in RP No.398/2010 by which the High Court dismissed the Review Petition filed by the appellant.

3.      The respondent herein filed the suit against the appellants seeking for the relief of declaration of his title to the suit property and for consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the appellants herein from interfering with his physical possession. Briefly the case of the plaintiff is that the suit property belonged to Guramma wife of the first defendant and the mother of the plaintiff and on her death the first defendant had given declaration before the revenue authorities to change the Katha in the name of the plaintiff in respect of the suit schedule property and mutation was effected accordingly and the revenue record stood in the name of the plaintiff for a long period of time. It is the further case of the plaintiff that the first defendant entered into second marriage with one Jayamma and defendants 2 to 5 are their children and they denied the ownership of the plaintiff in the suit property and therefore, the suit came to be filed.

4.      A common written statement was filed by the defendant stating that the suit property was purchased in the name of  Guramma under registered sale deed dated 14.11.1959 and  sale consideration was paid by the first defendant and after  the death of Guramma, the first defendant married Jayamma in 1973 and defendants 2 to 5 were born out of the wedlock and the plaintiff as well as the first defendant being the legal heirs of Guramma had succeeded to the suit property and the first defendant gifted a portion of suit property measuring 5 acres in favour of defendants 2 to 5 by registered gift deed dated 12.12.2003 and the suit is liable for dismissal.

5.      The trial court framed seven issues and after consideration of oral and documentary evidence dismissed the suit. On the appeal preferred by the plaintiff, the lower appellate court held that the plaintiff and the first defendant being class-I heirs of deceased Guramma are entitled to half share each in the suit property and decreed the suit in part. Challenging the same the plaintiff preferred second appeal and the High Court allowed the same by setting aside the judgment of the lower appellate court and decreed the suit in full as prayed for. Aggrieved by the same the defendants have preferred the present appeals. For the sake of convenience, the parties are described in this judgment as arrayed in the suit.

6.      Mr. Basavaprabhu S. Patil, the learned senior counsel  appearing for the appellants mainly contended that the High Court has failed to note that the plaintiff himself had never pleaded a case of relinquishment of the share by the first defendant in the suit property and what was pleaded in the plaint was that he had succeeded to the property of his mother  absolutely and his father namely the first defendant has consented before the revenue authorities for change of name in the Katha in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the suit schedule property and thus the first defendant had acquiesced to the fact of the entire suit property being put in the name of the plaintiff and according to the learned counsel the mutation entry can never be considered as relinquishment of right or title and the High Court has committed a serious error in accepting the case of the plaintiff and in support of his submissions relied on the decision of this Court in Balwant Singh and another vs. Daulat Singh (Dead) by Lrs. And ors. [(1997) 7 SCC 137].

7.      Per contra the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents contended that pursuant to the statement made by the 1st  defendant to the Revenue Authorities, the entire suit property was put in the name of plaintiff, by effecting mutation entry in Katha and revenue records and thus the 1st  defendant, by his conduct had acquiesced to the said fact, as rightly held by the High Court. Alternatively the learned senior counsel contended that even if this Court holds in law that the 1st  defendant continues to be the title holder of half of suit property as class-I heir of deceased Guramma, in view of special circumstances, the justice of the case does not require interference or the relief could be moulded in a different fasion. In support of his submission he relied on Taherakhatoon (D) By Lrs. Vs. Salambin Mohammad (1999) 2 SCC 635 and Chandra Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (2003) 6 SCC 545).

8.    We considered the rival contentions. There is no dispute in the factual matrix. Guramma was the first wife of 1st  defendant and the plaintiff was their only son and suit property was purchased by Guramma by Exh. P-1 sale deed dated 14.11.1959 and the property stood in her name in revenue record. The plaintiff was born on 1.10.1965 and Guramma died on 20.1.1966. As per Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, the husband and the son of deceased Guramma, namely 1st defendant and the plaintiff, being class-I heirs succeeded to the suit property. As per Exh. P-8, Katha of suit property was changed to the name of plaintiff from his mother on 9.1.1990 and the endorsement therein made by the Tahsildar reveals that the 1st defendant accepted the mutation of entry in the name of the plaintiff, being their only son and on the basis of  the said declaration, the mutation was effected and it was not challenged. Exh. D-10 is the RTC extract covering the period from 1989 to 1992 and the plaintiff was shown as the owner of  the suit property.

9.      As rightly contended by the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants, 1st  defendant did not relinquish or release his right in respect of the half share in the suit property at any point of time and that is also not the case pleaded by the plaintiff. The assumption on the part of the High Court that as a result of the mututation, 1st  defendant divested himself of the title and possession of  half  share  in suit property is wrong. The mutation entries do not convey or extinguish any title and those entries are relevant only for the purpose of collection of land revenue. The observations of this Court in Balwant Singh’s case  (supra) are relevant and are extracted below :

a)   21. We have considered the rival submissions and we are of the view that Mr Sanyal is right in his contention that the courts were not correct in assuming that as a result of Mutation No. 1311 dated 19-7-1954, Durga Devi lost her title from that date and possession also was given to the persons in whose favour mutation was effected. In Sawarni  vs. Inder Kaur (1996) 6 SCC 223, Pattanaik, J.,speaking for the Bench has clearly held as follows: (SCC p. 227, para 7)

b)   “7. … Mutation of a property in the revenue record does not create or extinguish title nor has it any presumptive value on title. It only enables the person in whose favour mutation is ordered to pay the land revenue in question. The learned Additional District Judge was wholly in error in coming to a conclusion that mutation in favour of Inder Kaur conveys title in her favour. This erroneous conclusion has vitiated the entire judgment.”

c)   22. Applying the above legal position, we hold that the widow had not divested herself of the title in the suit property as a result of Mutation No. 1311 dated 19-7-1954. The assumption on the part of the courts below that as a result of the mutation, the widow divested herself of the title and possession was wrong. If that be so, legally, she was in possession on the date of coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act and she, as a full owner, had every right to deal with the suit properties in any manner she desired.”

  In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the High Court erred in concluding that the 1st  defendant by his conduct had acquiesced and divested himself of title of his half share in suit property and the said erroneous conclusion is liable to be set aside.

10.          The learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff strenuously contended that the 1st defendant is now 90 years old and owns lots of properties as enumerated in the list furnished by him before this Court and the plaintiff is his only son through first wife and litigation pertains to only one property namely the suit property and though this Court gave ample opportunities, no settlement could be arrived at between the parties and considering the special circumstances, this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution may not interfere with the High Court judgment, which will do complete justice to the parties and relied on the decisions cited supra.

11.          We are not in a position to appreciate this contention. The High Court misdirected itself and committed  serious error warranting our interference with the impugned judgment.

12.          In the result the impugned judgment and decree of the High Court are set aside and the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court is restored and the appeals are allowed in the above terms. No costs.


…………………………….J.
(V. Gopala Gowda)
…………………………….J.
(C. Nagappan)
New Delhi;

April 17 , 2015

Wednesday, April 15, 2015

Beneficial Interest between Nominee and Legal Heirs

In view of the clear legal position, it is made abundantly clear that the amount in any head can be received by the nominee, but the amount can be claimed by the heirs of the deceased in accordance with law of succession governing them. In other words, nomination does not confer any beneficial interest on the nominee.                                        (Para 19)

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.809 OF 2002
Shipra Sengupta .. Appellant
Versus
Mridul Sengupta & Others .. Respondents

J U D G M E N T: Dalveer Bhandari, J.

1.     This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 12.9.2000 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 1209 of 1998.

2.      The appellant is the wife of Late Shri Shyamal Sengupta who was a Head Clerk in the State Bank of India, Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh. He was initially an employee of the Imperial Bank of India and after constitution of the State Bank of India under the State Bank of India Act, 1955, the business of the Imperial Bank of India was taken over by the State Bank of  India as per the provisions of the State Bank of India Act, 1955. Shyamal Sengupta died issueless on 8.11.1990 at Bhopal. He left behind him his widow Smt. Shipra Sengupta, his mother Niharbala Sengupta, his brothers Pushpal Sengupta and Mirdul Sengupta.

3.      It may be pertinent to mention that Shyamal Sengupta was unmarried at the time when he joined the service of the bank and he nominated his mother as his nominee.

4.      The appellant herein Smt. Shipra Sengupta filed an application under section 372 of the Indian Succession Act, 1956, in which she claimed that she was entitled to her share of insurance, gratuity, public provident fund etc. etc. According to the appellant, her claim was based on the principle that any nomination made by Shyamal Sengupta prior to his marriage would automatically stand cancelled after his marriage.

5.      The appellant submitted that after the death of her husband both, she and mother of the deceased Niharbala Sengupta, were Class-I heirs under the schedule of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and consequently she was, therefore, equally entitled to succeed to the property along with her mother-in-law Niharbala Sengupta.

6.      The Trial Court granted succession certificate to the appellant and the mother of the deceased in respect of total amount of life insurance, gratuity, public provident fund and general provident fund due to Shyamal Sengupta. The Trial Court held that both of them shall be entitled to half share in the aforesaid amounts due to Shyamal Sengupta from different heads. As to rest of the items mentioned in paragraph 6 of the application, the Trial Court held that the appellant alone was entitled to a succession certificate.

7.      In an appeal jointly filed by the mother of the deceased Niharbala Sengupta and brother of the deceased Pushpal Sengupta, the Appellate Court rejected the contention of the applicants that on account of nomination made in favour of Niharbala Sengupta, in respect of the aforesaid items, the appellant Smt. Shipra Sengupta would not get any share in the amount credited or payable to Shyamal Sengupta. The learned District Judge held that the nomination did not confer any beneficial interest in the amount due towards life insurance, gratuity, public provident fund and general provident fund.

8.      The learned District Judge relied on the decision of this Court in Smt. Sarbati Devi & Another v. Smt. Usha Devi (1984) 1 SCC 424 and on Om Wati v. Delhi Transport Corporation, New Delhi & Others 1988 Lab. I.C. 500 and modified the order of the Civil Judge in respect of other items holding that the mother of the deceased Niharbala Sengupta being the Class-I heir under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was equally entitled to the half share along with the appellant Smt. Shipra Sengupta. Accordingly, the learned District Judge modified the order passed by the Civil Judge and directed him to issue succession certificate in accordance with the modifications made by him in the order of the Civil Judge.

9.      Niharbala Sengupta and Pushpal Sengupta, aggrieved by the order of the District Judge, filed a Civil Revision before the High Court. During the pendency of the said civil revision, Niharbala Sengupta died and her other son Mirdul Sengupta was substituted in her place on the basis of an alleged Will executed by her prior to her death in favour of Mirdul Sengupta. The Will expressly dealt with the amount to which she was entitled to receive as a consequence of grant of a succession certificate.

10.          Pushpal Sengupta did not challenge the Will by which he was affected. Therefore, the position that emerged was that the court must presume for the purpose of this revision that the Will is validly executed in favour of Mirdul Sengupta.

11.          In the impugned judgment, the High Court relied on the judgment of Sarbati Devi (supra) and observed that the nomination did not confer any beneficial interest on the nominee. The High Court passed the following order:

(i) The amount of General Provident Fund deposited in the name of Shyamal Sengupta declaring that Mirdul Sengupta shall be entitled to entire sum due to Shyamal Sengupta together with interest to which he is entitled as per rules of deposit by the Bank till he is paid in full.

(ii) So far as rest of the items mentioned in paragraph 6(a) of the application under section 372 are concerned it is declared that after the death of Niharbala Sengupta, Mirdul Sengupta is entitled to succession certificate along with Shipra Sengupta. Both of them shall be entitled to 1/2 share each as directed by the District Judge.

(iii) The Civil Judge shall also direct non-applicant No. 2 or any other authority to pay the interest on the amount mentioned in paragraph 2 till that is paid to them at the usual rate of 9% from the date of death of Shyamal Sengupta or the usual rate available to the depositor/subscriber whichever is less.”

12.           The appellant, aggrieved by the impugned judgment of the High Court, preferred this appeal. The following questions have been raised by the appellant in this appeal:

I. Whether nomination of mother by a member of  a Provident fund governed by the Imperial Bank of India Employees’ Provident Fund Rules before his marriage confers ownership on the nominee and destroys right of succession of the widow under Succession Act?

II. Whether nomination only indicates the hand which is authorized to receive the amount on the payment of which trustees of the provident fund get a valid discharge?

III. Whether the provident fund can be claimed by the heirs of the member of the provident fund in accordance with the law of succession governing them?

IV. Whether it was proper for the High Court to rely upon a forged and fabricated Will which was not even signed by Niharbala?

V. Whether it was proper for the High Court to accept the alleged Will on record in its revisional Jurisdiction, in absence of any application to that effect?

VI. Whether the High Court was entitled to take Will on record without giving fresh opportunity to lead evidence on it?

VII. Whether the High Court was right in interpreting and relying upon section 3(2) of  Provident Fund Act, 1925?”

13.          The appellant submitted that according to the settled legal position crystallized by the judgment of Sarbati Devi (supra), the principle of law is that the nomination is only the hand which accepts the amount and a nomination does not confer any beneficial interest in the nominee.

14.           In Sarbati Devi (supra), this Court has laid down that a mere nomination does not have the effect of conferring to the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the life insurance policy, on death of the insurer. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorized to receive the amount on payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession.

15.           The appellant also placed reliance on the judgment of  this Court in Vishin N. Khanchandani & Another v. Vidya Lachmandas Khanchandani & Another (2000) 6 SCC 724, wherein this Court held that the law laid down in Sarbati Devi (supra) holds the field and is equally applicable to the nominee becoming entitled to the payment of the amount on account of National Savings Certificates received by him under Section 6 read with Section 7 of the Act who in turn is liable to return the amount to those in whose favour the law creates a beneficial interest, subject to the provisions of subsection (2) of Section 8 of the Act.

16.            Learned counsel for the appellant also placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court in Ashok Chand Aggarwala v. Delhi Administration & Others (1998) VII AD (Delhi) 639. This case related to the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act. The High Court while following Sarbati Devi case (supra) held that it is well settled that mere nomination made in favour of a particular person does not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in property after the death of the person concerned. The nomination indicates the hand which is authorized to receive the amount or manage the property. The property or the amount, as the case may be, can be claimed by the heirs of the deceased, in accordance with the law of succession, governing them.

17.          The controversy involved in the instant case is no longer res integra. The nominee is entitled to receive the same, but the amount so received is to be distributed according to the law of succession.

18.          In terms of the factual foundation laid in this case, the deceased died on 8.11.1990 leaving behind his mother and widow as his only heirs and legal representatives entitled to succeed. Therefore, on the day when the right of succession opened, the appellant, his widow became entitled to one half of the amount of the general provident fund, the other half  going to the mother and on her death, the other surviving son getting the same.

19.          In view of the clear legal position, it is made abundantly clear that the amount in any head can be received by the nominee, but the amount can be claimed by the heirs of the deceased in accordance with law of succession governing them. In other words, nomination does not confer any beneficial interest on the nominee. In the instant case amounts so received are to be distributed according to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The State Bank of India is directed to release half of the amount of general provident fund to the appellant now within two months from today along with interest.

20.          The appeal filed by the appellant is accordingly allowed and disposed of, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

……….…………………………….J.
(Dalveer Bhandari)
..……..….………...……….…….J.
(Dr. Mukundakam Sharma)
New Delhi;

August 20, 2009.