If a spouse abuses the
other as being born from a prostitute, this cannot be termed as “wear and tear”
of family life. Summoning the police on false or flimsy grounds cannot also be
similarly viewed. Making it impossible for any close relatives to visit or
reside in the matrimonial home would also indubitably result in cruelty to the
other spouse. (Para 7)
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL
Nos. 5511-5512 OF 2014
VINOD KUMAR
SUBBIAH .…..APPELLANTS
Versus
SARASWATHI
PALANIAPPAN …..RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T: VIKRAMAJIT SEN,J.
1.
These Appeals
assail the Judgment of the learned Single Judge of theHigh Court of Judicature
at Madras, Bench at Madurai, delivered on 13.3.2013, setting aside the Judgment dated 25.8.2011
of the Trial Court. The Impugned Judgment dismissed the divorce petition filed
by the Appellant.
2.
The Appellant and
the Respondent were married on 28.6.2004 and moved to the U.S. on 9.7.2004.
They visited Chennai in October 2005 and June 2006. During the latter visit,
the Respondent was three months pregnant and left for her parental home in
Madurai on 10.6.2006 where she gave birth to a male child on 5.12.2006. The
Appellant subsequently filed for divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu
Marriage Act on 30.4.2007.
3.
The case put
forward by the Appellant is that the Respondent was verbally abusive; she would
insult his family; she would threaten to lodge false police complaints; and she
would threaten to commit suicide placing the blame on the Appellant and his
family. After she left for her parental home in June 2006, the Appellant
attempted to bring her back to her matrimonial home but she refused. The
Appellant claims that he has been put through intolerable mental agony and can
no longer continue to be married to the Respondent.
4.
The Respondent
denied these allegations and claimed that she and the Appellant lived happily
in the U.S., and she only went to her parental home in June 2006 for her child
to be born there. She has pleaded that she returned to Chennai with her child
from March to April 2007, that the divorce petition was completely unexpected
and was the result of a misunderstanding between her family and that of the
Appellant. She subsequently filed a petition seeking restitution of conjugal
rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, praying that the Appellant be
directed to take her back to her conjugal home, which she pleaded is in the
U.S. She alleged that her husband is living a wayward life, that her
father-in-law misbehaved with her, and that her parents-in-law were negligent
with her infant child and asked her to leave the house when she questioned them
about this. She also filed a maintenance petition seeking Rs. 2 lakhs per month
as maintenance.
5.
The Trial Court
heard all three petitions together and examined the evidence submitted by the
parties at length. The Appellant has deposed that when his sister came to the
U.S., she initially stayed with him and the Respondent. However, the Respondent
did not like having her in the house, so she locked the Respondent and his
sister out of the house, was abusive towards them and told them that they
belonged to a “prostitute family”. Eventually the Appellant’s sister was
constrained to stay at a Lodge. The Respondent claimed that the dispute was
because her sister-in-law tried to make her join her diamond business, which
she did not want to do. The Trial Court found no truth in the argument of the
Respondent, in light of the fact that she has no background or knowledge of the
diamond business. Furthermore, the Appellant has deposed that when his brother
came to the U.S. to study, he also initially stayed at the Appellant’s house.
However, it is in evidence that the Respondent called the Appellant at work
alleging that his brother was knocking on her door, thus implying that he was
behaving in an untoward manner. She abused the Appellant and his family in the
presence of his brother and threatened to file a police complaint. The
Appellant has deposed that he was forced to make his brother stay elsewhere. In
a subsequent event, the Appellant informed the Respondent that his parents
would be coming to the U.S. The Respondent was verbally and physically abusive,
and called the police alleging domestic violence. The Appellant was given a
warning by the Police. The Respondent claimed that the incident took place
because the Appellant was having an affair with a woman named Solai. She
claimed that he took her to Solai’s house that evening and then wanted to go
back at night, which is why she called the police. The Trial Court has
justifiably highlighted that summoning the police was serious because the
Appellant was in a foreign country and didn’t know the laws and procedure.
Further, the allegation that he was having an affair was not accepted, as it
was unbelievable that the Respondent had previously not told anyone about Solai
and further that it never came up du ring the attempted compromise between the
families of the two parties. The Respondent claimed that after having the
child, she came to live with the Appellant, which the Appellant denied. The
Respondent also alleged that while she was living with the Appellant’s family,
his parents took the child who was only three months old away for six hours. By
the time they brought him back, he was unconscious due to starvation. When the
Respondent questioned them about this, they asked her to leave the house with
the child, even though it was late in the night. The Trial Court found this
allegation entirely unbelievable. Her allegation that the father of the
Appellant started misbehaving with her and went to the extent of pulling her
hands was also found to be false. The Trial Court also took into consideration
the voice mails and emails from the Respondent to the Appellant, which were not
treated as the main evidence but as evidence intended to substantiate the oral
evidence. It was held that the evidence and the submissions of the Respondent
indicate that she was unwilling to live in the Appellant’s house in Chennai,
and that she wanted him to leave his family in India and live in the U.S. with
her. It is pertinent to note that the Appellant had lost his job in the U.S.
and was unemployed and consequently had to set up residence in Chennai. In
light of these circumstances, it was found that the Respondent is not entitled
to conjugal rights. An order of dissolution of marriage was passed and
maintenance was fixed at Rs. 25,000 per month.
6.
The High Court,
however, held that the Appellant’s allegations in his divorce petition were no
more than “the ordinary wear and tear” that takes place in a marriage. It
observed that the Appellant did not give details of the events of abuse by the
Respondent towards his family or the cruelty that was meted out to him in the
U.S. in his main petition or his subsequent counter affidavits. It was only
after filing the petition that the Appellant had produced copies of the abusive
voicemails and emails he received from the Respondent. The High Court noted
that the Trial Court did not need to strictly adhere to hard and fast rules
while entertaining evidence, but nevertheless held that the Trial Court had acted
in haste in allowing the Appellant’s allegations. The High Court found that the
Trial Court, instead of considering whether the Appellant had established cruelty
by adducing evidence, took certain answers from the Respondent’s Chief
examination and cross-examination out of context and held that a case of cruelty
was made out. The High Court stated that in a matrimonial relationship, parties
must be prepared to subject themselves to the normal wear and tear of life, and
that the situation at hand was no more than that. The divorce petition was thus
dismissed and the petition for restitution of conjugal rights was allowed.
7.
We have carefully
considered the matter, and find that we are unable to uphold the conclusions of
the High Court. The Appellant had duly pleaded instances of mental cruelty
which he proved in evidence and documents. An examination of the divorce
petition makes it abundantly clear that various allegations of cruelty were
made out and a number of incidents were mentioned therein. Further evidence was
submitted during the course of the Trial to substantiate these allegations,
which is in keeping with Order VI Rule 2 of the CPC. Furthermore, we find that
the Trial Court examined the evidence at great length and came to the reasoned
conclusion that the actions of the Respondent amounted to cruelty. If a spouse
abuses the other as being born from a prostitute, this cannot be termed as “wear
and tear” of family life. Summoning the police on false or flimsy grounds
cannot also be similarly viewed. Making it impossible for any close relatives
to visit or reside in the matrimonial home would also indubitably result in
cruelty to the other spouse. After a cursory discussion of the evidence which
the Trial Court had discussed threadbare, the High Court was not justified to
set aside the conclusions arrived at by the Trial Court without giving
substantiated reasons.
8.
We thus allow
these Appeals and set aside the Impugned Order, but desist from imposing costs.
The Trial Court’s decision granting dissolution of the marriage between the
parties is hereby restored.
9.
We allow the
Respondent’s Application for disbursement of the amount
deposited by
the Appellant towards her legal expenses in pursuance of the Order dated
4.7.2013.
.................................................J.
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN]
…….............................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
New Delhi;
April 24, 2015.
