Held:
1.
We are not oblivious of the fact that the said provision has been inserted
to regulate the growing business, trade, commerce and industrial activities of
the country and the strict liability to promote greater vigilance in financial
matters and to safeguard the faith of the creditor in the drawer of the cheque
which is essential to the economic life of a developing country like India.
This, however, shall not mean that the courts shall put a blind eye to the
ground realities.
2.
The High Court was entitled to take notice of the
conduct of the parties. It has been found by the High Court as of fact that the
complainant did not approach the court with clean hands. His conduct was not
that of a prudent man. Why no instrument was executed although a huge sum of
money was allegedly paid to the respondent was a relevant question which could
be posed in the matter. It was open to the High Court to draw its own conclusion
therein. Not only no document had been executed, even no interest had been
charged. It would be absurd to form an opinion that despite knowing that the
respondent even was not in a position to discharge his burden to pay installments
in respect of the prized amount, an advance would be made to him and that too
even after institution of three civil suits. The amount advanced even did not
carry any interest. If in a situation of this nature, the High Court has
arrived at a finding that the respondent has discharged his burden of proof cast
on him under Section 139 of the Act, no exception thereto can be taken.
Supreme court of india
CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.) 518 of 2006
Krishna Janardhan Bhat : PETITIONER
v Dattatraya G. Hegde:
RESPONDENT
BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Harjit Singh Bedi, DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/01/2008
J U D G M E N T : S.B. SINHA, J
3. Appellant and one R.G. Bhat were jointly
running a business in the name and style of Vinaya Enterprises at Hubli
together. Appellant executed a Power of Attorney in his favour.
4. Allegedly, he had handed over four blank
cheques to the said constituted attorney for meeting the expenses of the
business. The counter foil of the cheque books was also allegedly filled in by
Shri R.G. Bhat. The cheque bearing No. 044483 was shown to have been a self
drawn one for a sum of Rs. 1500/-.
5. Disputes and differences having arisen between
the appellant and the said R.G. Bhat in connection with running of the said
business, the power of attorney granted in his favour was cancelled by the
appellant. Disputes and differences between the parties were referred to the
Panchayat. In the meeting of the Panchayat held on 02.10.1996,
complainant/respondent who is the brother-in-law of the said R.G. Bhat was
admittedly present. He participated therein. The result of the said meeting of
the Panchayat is not known but it is not in dispute that the appellant herein
issued a public notice through his advocate in a local newspaper on 3.10.1996
to the following effect:
“My client Sh. Krishna Janardhana Bhat,
Proprietor of Vinaya Enterprises, Tarihal Hubli has given authority to give
notice as follows:
My
client appointed Shri Raghavendra Ganapati Bhat as his power of Attorney Holder
on 21.8.1993 to run Vinay Enterprises as agent. He has started misusing the
terms and conditions of the Power of Attorney. Hence my client cancelled the
Power of Attorney on 21.8.96 by giving notice. If at all anybody deals with him
on the Power of Attorney my client is not responsible in future.”
6. On the premise that the respondent advanced a
sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- to the appellant on 14.6.1998 and the latter on his own
went to his house on 20.7.1998 to return the loan by an account payee cheque
which having been dishonoured when presented; a complaint petition was filed.
7. Prior
thereto, a notice was sent on 27.8.1998 which was allegedly served on the
appellant on 5.9.1998. He on that day itself sent a reply alleging in substance
that the complainant had been colluding with R.G. Bhat in regard thereto,
stating:
“Your client D.G. Hegde Goddalamane is husband
of sister of my power of attorney holder R.G. Bhat (Proprietor Prasad
Enterprises Tarihal Industrial Estate) of Hubli. I do not have any dealing with
him as alleged in your letter. Knowing that the power of attorney holder R.G.
Bhat has lost faith and having acted illegally and in anticipation of his committing
further illegal acts I have legally cancelled my power of attorney and
published the notice in a famous Kannada daily \023Samyukta Karnataka\024 on
3.10.96. From that date I do not have any relation with him or any of his
relatives including your client. Please verify the handwriting and signature on
the cheque and advice your client not to do such (illegalities) colluding with
his brother-in-law.”
8. The
learned Trial Judge convicted the appellant and sentenced him to undergo
imprisonment for six months and further directed payment of compensation for a
sum of Rs. 1,50,000/-. An appeal preferred there against was dismissed by the
Sessions Judge by a judgment and order dated 28.7.2004.
9. The
High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, however, on a revision
petition filed by the appellant, partly allowed the same by reducing the
substantive sentence to one week.
10. The
Special Leave Petition was filed by the appellant in person. As it was noticed
by a Bench of this Court that some question of law arises for its consideration,
Mr. S. Balakrishnan, learned senior counsel was requested to assist the Court.
11. Mr.
Balakrishnan urged that the learned Trial Judge, the Sessions Court as also the
High Court committed a serious illegality insofar as it misread and misapplied
the provisions of Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short “the
Act”).
It was contended that the procedural requirements of Section 138 are:
(i)
There is a legally
enforceable debt.
(ii)
The drawer of the cheque
issued the cheque to satisfy part or whole
of the debt.
(iii)
The cheque so issued has
been returned due to insufficiency of funds.
It was urged that only ingredient No. 2 is a subject matter of presumption
under Section 139 of the Act and not the first one. It was argued that except
the word of mouth of the complainant nothing has been brought on record to
prove the offence as against the appellant.
12. Mr.
S.N. Bhat, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other
hand, submitted that the appellant has rightly been found guilty of commission
of an offence under Section 138 of the Act as bouncing of the cheque issued by
him carries a mandatory presumption in terms of Section 139 read with Section
118 (a) of the Act.
It was urged that it is not believable that the appellant despite
referring the dispute to the Panchayat and issuing a paper publication on
3.10.1996 would not insist on taking back the cheque book from his erstwhile constituted
attorney or would not inform the bank thereabout. Moreover, he having come out
with a positive defence, it was for him to prove the same.
13. Before
we embark upon the factual issue involved herein, we would notice the manner in
which the court proceeded to determine the case. The learned Trial Judge framed
the following points for its determination:
(1) Whether the complainant proves the hilt
that the accused to discharge earlier debt of Rs.1,50,000/-, has got issued a
cheque on 20.7.1998 for Rs.1,50,000/- drawn at Vijay Bank, Tarahal Branch, Hubli?
(2) If so, whether the said cheque came to be dishonoured
as \023funds insufficient\024 after its presentation
and despite of issuance of notice, the accused did not pay the due amount
within stipulated time without any cause, thereby Negotiable Instruments Act?
The learned Trial Judge noticed the contents of the claim petition as also
the evidence of PW-1. It also noticed the suggestions given to the said PW-1 by
the appellant herein. Upon taking into consideration the same as also the
statement of the appellant under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
it posed a question as to whether there was no debt payable by the accused to
the complainant and if so, whether the complainant colluding with R.G. Bhat had
created the cheque with an intention to cause loss to the appellant. It,
however, without making any further discussion, answered the said question
directly on the material brought on record referring to a decision of the
Karnataka High Court in S.R. Muralidar v. Ashok G.Y. [ILR 2001
Karnataka 4127] in extenso and opining that his decision in the case is similar
to that of the Karnataka High Court, stating:
“Considering the proposition of law, in the
present case also the accused admitted the signature on Ex.P.1. But, the contention
is that his P.A. Holder mis-utilized his signed blank cheques through his relative
complainant and the fact of the present case and fact of the decision mentioned
by me are similar one and the observation made by the Hon\022ble High Court in
the above decision and principle laid down therein are clearly applicable to
the case in hand. Therefore, the defence taken by the accused herein without
stepping into the witness-box, is not acceptable one and there is no cogent
evidence produced by the accused to prove his special reasons for issuance of
the cheque in question.”
14. It
again referred to a decision of this Court in K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan
Balan and Others [AIR 1999 SC 3762] and made almost a similar
observation holding that as the complainant has discharged his initial burden,
the onus shifted on the accused to produce rebuttal evidence against the
presumption laid down in favour of the complainant stating:
“Here, the accused has not produced any
evidence to discard the testimony of PW-1. Therefore, the presumption is to be
drawn in favour of the holder of the cheque, who has received it for discharge
of liability in view of the decision of the Hon\022ble Supreme Court”.
15. Yet
again, it relied upon a decision of the Karnataka High Court in M/s.
Devi Tyres v. Nawab Jan [AIR 2001 Karnataka H.C.R. 2154], wherein it
was opined:
“There is issued (sic) that the amount is
payable and no criminal court is required to embark upon any enquiry that goes
behind the Act of issuance of the cheque. If the drawer contends that there
were certain special reasons whereby a cheque was issued and that the cheque
was not intended to be encashed or honoured, the onus of establishing this shifts
squarely to the accused”.
16. The
complainant case was, thus, primarily accepted for the reason that the
appellant did not step into the witness box.
17. The
appellate court took an identical stand. It proceeded on the premise that the
statement of accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
regarding misuse of blank cheque by the complainant and filling up Rs.
1,50,000/- instead of Rs. 1500/- is contradictory to his own admission in the
reply to the notice issued to him. On what basis the said opinion was formed is
not known. The appellate court refused to enter into the question as to whether
the prosecution case is wholly unreliable, as the complainant had not been able
to show his source of income so as to enable him to advance a huge loan of Rs.
1,50,000/-, holding:
“Now as far as the financial ability of the complainant
to issue cheque for such huge amount to the accused is not a matter to be
considered by the trial court or by me also since issue of Ex.P.1 and its
dishonour is proved by the complainant beyond reasonable doubt.”
18. The
High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction although accepted the
contention of the appellant that the presumption under Section 139 of the Act
extends only to the extent that the
holder of the cheque received the cheque for the discharge in whole or in part
of any debt or other liability and the
same only means that cheque was issued for consideration, but does not extend
to the extent that the cheque was issued for the discharge of the debt or
liability as pleaded by the accused, opined that the complainant had discharged
that onus by adducing his own evidence. Observing that the appellant did not
step into the witness box, it was opined that although the relationship between
the appellant and Shri R.G. Bhat was strained, there was nothing to show that
the relationship between the appellant and the complainant became strained
despite the fact that a panchayat meeting was held in regard to the said
dispute in 1996. The High Court, however, refused to go into the factual aspect
of the matter stating that it was exercising a revisional jurisdiction,
stating:
“Since
the burden of proving that the cheque had been misused is on the
accused-petitioner, and there being a concurrent finding of the Trial Court and
the Appellant Court with regard to that holding that the petitioner had failed
to discharge that burden, I do not find any ground to interfere in the order of
the Trial Court and that the Appellate Court, so far as they hold the
petitioner guilty of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act.”
19. Before
embarking upon the legal issues, we may analyse the deposition of PW-1 Complainant. He was a resident of village Goddalmane.
Appellant is a resident of village Kekkar. As he was running an industry at
Hubli, he sometimes resided in Hubli also. They were said to be friends. He
asked him to give a loan of Rs. 1.5 lakhs in the first week of June, 1998 and
the amount was handed over to him on 14th June, 1998. It was allegedly agreed
that on the appellant failure to repay the said loan within one month, 15%
interest would be charged. No document was executed; no pronote was executed;
no receipt was obtained. Appellant is said to have come to his house suo moto
on 20.07.1998 and handed over the cheque which was sent to Varada Grameen Bank
for collection whereupon notice had been issued. Despite the fact that he was
aware that a dispute had been raised in regard to the writings in the cheque,
the same was not proved. Merely, the cheque was tendered and it was marked as
an exhibit. The cheque appears to have been issued as a proprietor of a
business concern.
Despite the fact that R.G. Bhat was his brother-in-law, he denied that he
was running the said business. He also feigned his ignorance as to whether the
said industry was being run by R.G. Bhat on the basis of the Power of Attorney
executed by the appellant. He, however, accepted that they had been running it
together. He also accepted the relationship between him and R.G. Bhat. He knew about
the dispute. He accepted that a panchayat meeting was held in regard thereto.
Surprisingly, he denied his knowledge in regard to the existence of the power
of attorney stating that the same was not made in his presence. He admitted
that he was present on 2.10.1996 in the panchayat meeting to resolve the
problem arising out of the dispute between R.G. Bhat and the appellant. He
accepted that wooden and steel materials were placed in Vinay Enterprises and
R.G. Bhat had been running the same type of industry in Tarihal Industrial
Estate. According to him, he had been running such an industry in the name of
Prasad Enterprises even prior to 1996. His acquaintance, according to him, with
the appellant was only through his brother-in-law. He did not say that he had
friendship with the appellant. There also does not appear to be any business transactions
between them. He could not state about the denomination of the notes although
according to him he had drawn the amount from the society.
He did not produce any books of accounts or any other proof to show that
he got so much money from the bank. He admittedly did not have any written
document pertaining to the accused. He accepted that there was no witness to
the transaction. He, of course, denied certain suggestions, but the suggestions
put to him were required to be considered by the court below in the backdrop of
the facts and circumstances of the case.
20. The
courts below failed to notice that ordinarily in terms of Section 269SS of the
Income Tax Act, any advance taken by way of any loan of more than Rs. 20,000/-
was to be made by way of an account payee cheque only. Section 271D of the
Income Tax Act reads as under:
“271D. Penalty for failure to comply with the provisions
of section 269SS.
(1)
If a
person takes or accepts any loan or deposit in contravention of the provisions
of section 269SS, he shall be liable to pay, by way of penalty, a sum equal to
the amount of the loan or deposit so taken or accepted.
(2) Any penalty imposable under sub-section (1) shall
be imposed by the Joint Commissioner.”
21. Indisputably, a mandatory presumption is
required to be raised in terms of Section 118(b) and Section 139 of the Act.
Section 13(1) of the Act defines negotiable instrument to mean a promissory
note, bill of exchange or cheque payable either to order or to bearer.
Section 138 of the Act has three ingredients, viz.:
(i)
that there is a legally enforceable debt;
(ii)
that the cheque was drawn from the account of
bank for discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability which
presupposes a legally enforceable debt; and
(iii)
that the cheque so issued had been returned
due to insufficiency of funds.
22. The
proviso appended to the said section provides for compliance of legal
requirements before a complaint petition can be acted upon by a court of law.
Section 139 of the Act merely raises a presumption in regard to the second
aspect of the matter. Existence of legally recoverable debt is not a matter of
presumption under Section 139 of the Act. It merely raises a presumption in
favour of a holder of the cheque that the same has been issued for discharge of
any debt or other liability.
23. The
courts below, as noticed hereinbefore, proceeded on the basis that Section 139
raises a presumption in regard to existence of a debt also. The courts below,
in our opinion, committed a serious error in proceeding on the basis that for
proving the defence the accused is required to step into the witness box and
unless he does so he would not be discharging his burden. Such an approach on
the part of the courts, we feel, is not correct.
24. An
accused for discharging the burden of proof placed upon him under a statute
need not examine himself. He may discharge his burden on the basis of the
materials already brought on records. An accused has a constitutional right to
maintain silence. Standard of proof on the part of an accused and that of the
prosecution in a criminal case is different.
25. In Bharat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing
Company v. Amin Chand Payrelal [(1999) 3 SCC 35] interpreting Section
118(a) of the Act, this Court opined:
“Upon consideration of various judgments as noted hereinabove, the
position of law which emerges is that once execution of the promissory note is admitted,
the presumption under Section 118(a) would arise that it is supported by a
consideration. Such a presumption is rebuttable. The defendant can prove the
non-existence of a consideration by raising a probable defence. If the
defendant is proved to have discharged the initial onus of proof showing that
the existence of consideration was improbable or doubtful or the same was
illegal, the onus would shift to the plaintiff who will be obliged to prove it
as a matter of fact and upon its failure to prove would disentitle him to the
grant of relief on the basis of the negotiable instrument. The burden upon the
defendant of proving the nonexistence of the consideration can be either direct
or by bringing on record the preponderance of probabilities by reference to the
circumstances upon which he relies. In such an event, the plaintiff is entitled
under law to rely upon all the evidence led in the case including that of the
plaintiff as well. In case, where the defendant fails to discharge the initial
onus of proof by showing the non-existence of the consideration, the plaintiff would
invariably be held entitled to the benefit of presumption arising under Section
118(a) in his favour. The court may not insist upon the defendant to disprove
the existence of consideration by leading direct evidence as the existence of
negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated and even if led, is to
be seen with a doubt”
[Emphasis supplied]
26. Furthermore, whereas prosecution must prove
the guilt of an accused beyond all reasonable doubt, the standard of proof so
as to prove a defence on the part of an accused is preponderance of probabilities.
Inference of preponderance of
probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on records by
the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies.
27. A
statutory presumption has an evidentiary value. The question as to whether the
presumption whether stood rebutted or not, must, therefore, be determined
keeping in view the other evidences on record. For the said purpose, stepping
into the witness box by the appellant is not imperative. In a case of this
nature, where the chances of false implication cannot be ruled out, the
background fact and the conduct of the parties together with their legal
requirements are required to be taken into consideration.
28. In M.S.
Narayana Menon Alias Mani v. State of Kerala and Another [(2006) 6 SCC
39], it was held that once the accused is found to discharge his initial
burden, it shifts to the complainant.
29. Four
cheques, according to the accused, appear to have been drawn on the same day.
The counterfoil of the cheque book, according to the appellant, was in the
handwriting of R.G. Bhat wherein it was shown that apart from other payments, a
sum of Rs. 1500/- was withdrawn on a self drawn cheque. The courts below proceeded
to hold that the defence raised by the appellant has not been proved, which, in
our opinion, is not correct. He did not know that the said cheque had not been
encashed. He replied to the notice thinking that one of the cheque has been
misused. There is nothing on record to show that he knew that one of the
cheques was still with R.G. Bhat.
30. Disputes and differences between him and R.G.
Bhat stood established by admission of the respondent himself. Similar industry
was being run by R.G. Bhat although he was acting as the constituted attorney
of the appellant. According to the appellant, R.G. Bhat had cheated him. The counterfoil
showed that not more than Rs. 20,000/- had ever been withdrawn from that bank
at a time. The courts were required to draw an inference as to the probability
of the complainant\022s advancing a sum of Rs. 1.5 lakhs on mere asking and
that too without keeping any documentary proof. Even there was no witness. The
purported story that the appellant would himself come forward to return the
amount by a cheque knowing fully well that he did not have any sufficient funds
is difficult to believe.
31. In K.
Prakashan v. P.K. Surenderan [2007 (12) SCALE 96], this Court following
M.S.
Narayana Menon (supra) opined:
“12. The Act raises two presumptions; firstly, in regard to the passing
of consideration as contained in Section 118 (a) therein and, secondly, a presumption
that the holder of cheque receiving the same of the nature referred to in
Section 139 discharged in whole or in part any debt or other liability.
Presumptions both under Sections 118 (a) and 139 are rebuttable in nature.
Having regard to the definition of terms proved and disproved as contained in
Section 3 of the Evidence Act as also the nature of the said burden upon the prosecution
vis-‘-vis an accused it is not necessary that the accused must step into the
witness box to discharge the burden of proof in terms of the aforementioned
provision.
13. It is furthermore not in doubt or dispute that whereas the standard
of proof so far as the prosecution is concerned is proof of guilt beyond all
reasonable doubt; the one on the accused is only mere preponderance of
probability.
In John K. John v. Tom Varghese & Anr. [JT 2007 (13) SC 222],
this Court held:
“The High Court was entitled to take notice of
the conduct of the parties. It has been found by the High Court as of fact that
the complainant did not approach the court with clean hands. His conduct was
not that of a prudent man. Why no instrument was executed although a huge sum
of money was allegedly paid to the respondent was a relevant question which
could be posed in the matter. It was open to the High Court to draw its own conclusion
therein. Not only no document had been executed, even no interest had been
charged. It would be absurd to form an opinion that despite knowing that the
respondent even was not in a position to discharge his burden to pay installments
in respect of the prized amount, an advance would be made to him and that too
even after institution of three civil suits. The amount advanced even did not
carry any interest. If in a situation of this nature, the High Court has
arrived at a finding that the respondent has discharged his burden of proof cast
on him under Section 139 of the Act, no exception thereto can be taken.”
32. Mr.
Bhat relied upon a decision of this Court in Hiten P. Dalal v. Bratindranath Banerjee [(2001) 6 SCC 16] wherein
this Court held:
“22 Presumptions are rules of
evidence and do not conflict with the presumption of innocence, because by the
latter, all that is meant is that the prosecution is obliged to prove the case
against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The obligation on the prosecution
may be discharged with the help of presumptions of law or fact unless the accused
adduces evidence showing the reasonable possibility of the non-existence of the
presumed fact.
23 . In other words, provided the facts
required to form the basis of a presumption of law exist, no discretion is left
with the court but to draw the statutory conclusion, but this does not preclude
the person against whom the presumption is drawn from rebutting it and proving
the contrary. A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters
before it, the court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so
probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular
case, to act upon the supposition that it exists”.
Therefore, the rebuttal does not have to be conclusively established but
such evidence must be adduced before the court in support of the defence that
the court must either believe the defence to exist or consider its existence to
be reasonably probable, the standard of reasonability being that of the prudent
man.
[See also K.N. Beena v. Muniyappan and Another (2001) 8 SCC 458]
33. We
assume that the law laid down therein is correct. The views we have taken are
not inconsistent therewith.
34. But, we
may at the same time notice the development of law in this area in some
jurisdictions. The presumption of innocence is a human right.
[See Narender Singh & Anr. v. State of M.P. (2004) 10 SCC 699, Ranjitsing
Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (2005) 5 SCC 294
and Rajesh
Ranjan Yadav @ Pappu Yadav v. CBI through its Director (2007) 1 SCC 70]
Article 6(2) of he European Convention on Human Rights provides :
“Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent
until proved guilty according to law. Although India is not bound by the aforementioned
Convention and as such it may not be necessary like the countries forming
European countries to bring common law into land with the Convention, a
balancing of the accused rights and the interest of the society is required to
be taken into consideration. In India, however, subject to the statutory
interdicts, the said principle forms the basis of criminal jurisprudence. For
the aforementioned purpose the nature of the offence, seriousness as also
gravity thereof may be taken into consideration. The courts must be on guard to
see that merely on the application of presumption as contemplated under Section
139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the same may not lead to injustice or
mistaken conviction. It is for the aforementioned reasons that we have taken
into consideration the decisions operating in the field where the difficulty of
proving a negative has been emphasized. It is not suggested that a negative can
never be proved but there are cases where such difficulties are faced by the
accused e,g,. honest and reasonable mistake of fact. In a recent Article The Presumption of Innocence and Reverse
Burdens : A Balancing Duty published
in [2007] C.L.J. (March Part) 142 it has been stated :-
In determining whether a reverse burden is compatible with the
presumption of innocence regard should also be had to the pragmatics of proof.
How difficult would it be for the prosecution to prove guilt without the
reverse burden? How easily could an innocent defendant discharge the reverse
burden? But courts will not allow these pragmatic considerations to override
the legitimate rights of the defendant. Pragmatism will have greater sway where
the reverse burden would not pose the risk of great injustice where the offence is not too serious or the
reverse burden only concerns a matter incidental to guilt. And greater weight
will be given to prosecutorial efficiency in the regulatory environment.
35. We are
not oblivious of the fact that the said provision has been inserted to regulate
the growing business, trade, commerce and industrial activities of the country
and the strict liability to promote greater vigilance in financial matters and
to safeguard the faith of the creditor in the drawer of the cheque which is
essential to the economic life of a developing country like India. This,
however, shall not mean that the courts shall put a blind eye to the ground
realities. Statute mandates raising of presumption but it stops at that. It
does not say how presumption drawn should be held to have rebutted. Other
important principles of legal jurisprudence, namely presumption of innocence as
human rights and the doctrine of reverse burden introduced by Section 139
should be delicately balanced. Such balancing acts, indisputably would largely
depend upon the factual matrix of each case, the materials brought on record
and having regard to legal principles governing the same.
36. Keeping
in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the
opinion that the courts below approached the case from a wholly wrong angle,
viz., wrong application of the legal principles in the fact situation of the
case. In view of the legal position as has been enunciated by this Court in M.S. Narayana Menon (supra) and later
cases, we are of the opinion that the High Court should have entertained the
revision application.
37. For the
reasons aforementioned, the appeal is allowed. The judgments of conviction and
sentence passed against the appellant are set aside.
