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Saturday, March 29, 2014

Section 26 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 – Theft of Electricity

Section 26 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 – Theft of Electricity – penalty imposed at Rs. 5 lakhs and odd – challenged – High court held that the petition under sec.26 not considered and held that it was violation of principles of natural justice and as such set aside the orders of Board – Apex court held that in case of a theft of Electricity, the question of application of sec.26 does not arise and as such High court committed grave error – Apex court set aside the orders of High court and allowed the appeal.


Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO . 4023 of 2014
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 3396 of 2011)

Western Electricity Supply Co. of Orissa Ltd & Ors.        ...Appellants
vs
M/s Baba Baijanath Roller and Flour Mill P. Ltd.           ...Respondent
With
CA No.4024 of 2014
(arising out of SLP (Civil) No.3397 of 2011)


J U D G M E N T :Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J.

1.   Leave granted.

2.    This appeal is directed against an order dated August 3, 2010 passed by the High Court of Orissa allowing the writ petition filed by the respondent, quashing the bill issued by the appellant for a sum of 5,10,930/- as well the notice of disconnection dated October 5, 2010.

3.    The respondent-writ petitioner is a registered company, inter alia, carrying on its business under the name and style of M/s. Baba Baijnath Roller and Flour Mill Pvt. Ltd., having installed a Mill in the district of Jharsuguda and is the consumer of the appellant herein.

4.    The facts of the case, briefly, are as follows :

4.1.        The respondent alleged in the writ petition that on an inspection conducted by the appellant on September 9, 2002 at the premises of the respondent, the appellant intimated that at the time of inspection it was found that H.T. Meter, T.P Box’s inner door and meter terminal cover quick seals, plastic seals and paper seals were tampered. In addition, L.T.T.P Box inner door quick seals, plastic seals and paper seals were found tampered. The B-Phase P.T wire was found cut as such the meter was not getting B-Phase potential.

4.2.       It was further brought to the notice of the respondent by the appellant that the interference with the metering arrangement was made by the respondent in order to prevent the meter from recording actual consumption which attracts Regulation 64 of the Orissa Electricity Regulatory Commission Distribution (Conditions of Supply) Code, 1998 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”). Accordingly, the penal charges as per rules were intimated and raised on the respondent on September 30, 2002. The appellant further called upon the respondent to submit its representation, if any, within seven days. It was intimated that in default of payment of such charges within seven days from the date of receipt of the penal bill, the power supply to the premises will be disconnected without any further notice. The penal bill was raised on the respondent/writ petitioner for a sum of 5,10,930/-. On October 5, 2002 the electricity supply was disconnected since the respondent failed to make the payment.

4.3.       In these circumstances, a writ petition was filed by the respondent challenging the action on the part of the appellant before the High Court. The respondent-writ petitioner made out a case that the bill used to be received by the writ petitioner was around 80,000/- per month and according to the writ petitioner/respondent, the meter was defective and recording excessive consumption.

4.4.      The writ petitioner/respondent challenged the action on the part of the appellant that when the inspection was made, at that point of time the officers of the appellant made a demand for illegal gratification since refused by the Manager of the respondent-company, the officers of the appellant raised such allegations and further the Manager was forced to sign several papers under duress and coercion.

4.5.      It was urged before the High Court on behalf of the respondent-company on the ground (i) that the penal bill had been issued in violation of the principles of natural justice; (ii) that the inspection was made without giving a notice and in the absence of the representative of the firm; (iii) that the allegation of tampering with seals cannot be sustained as there was no allegation that the outer seal of T.P. box was broken or tampered with; and (iv) that the penal bill could not have been raised since the meter was defective and was not recording proper consumption. By filing a counter affidavit, the appellant herein duly contested the writ petition and stated that an alternative remedy was available to the respondent under the Code. It was further submitted that in the instant case, there is no question of alleging that the meter is defective. It is a clear case of theft of electricity by the consumer and Section 26 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1910”) has no application. It is submitted that Section 26(6) of the Act of 1910 is attracted only when a meter is defective and is incapable of recording the correct consumption of electricity. It was further contended on behalf of the appellant before the High Court that inspection of the meter was done in the presence of the representative of the writpetitioner/ respondent.

4.6.      The High Court after hearing the parties held that in case of violation of principles of natural justice even if alternative remedy is available, a writ court can interfere for redressal of grievance of the petitioner. The High Court further held that the representation filed by the writ petitioner was never considered before the imposition of penalty, far less giving an opportunity of hearing to the writ petitioner. Accordingly, the High Court held that this action of the appellant is in clear violation of the principles of natural justice. In these circumstances, the High Court set aside the penalty charges imposed by the appellant on the writ petitioner/respondent. The inspection report was also quashed on the ground that such inspection was never done in the presence of the authorised persons of the writ petitioner. The High Court further held that since the penalty is untenable, the appellant was not entitled to levy delayed payment surcharge on the penal charges treating it as old arrears or current arrears. In these circumstances, the High Court further directed to refund the amount so paid within three months.

4.7.      Being aggrieved, this appeal has been filed by the appellant.

5.   Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant contended before us that the High Court has erred in holding that the matter should come within the purview of Section 26(6) of the Act of 1910. He submitted that the High Court ignoring the judicial pronouncements on this question undermined the authority of the licensee (appellant) to impose penalty as a consequence on a consumer even if the consumer has committed theft of electricity. By this process, the provisions of the statutory Code have been made nugatory. The meter could be subjected to tampering in various ways. The methods as detected on inspection by the officers of the appellant are more than sufficient to conclude that the meter was tampered with and did not record the actual consumption of energy consumed by the writ petitioner/ respondent. He further contended that the theft of electricity is governed by the Code and not under the provisions of the Act of 1910.

6.   The relevant provisions of the Act of 1910 as well as the Code, in particular Clauses 54, 56, 64, 105, 110 and 115, were duly placed before us. It will be proper for us to reproduce those hereunder:

“Section 26 - Meters. – (1) In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the amount of energy supplied to a consumer or the electrical quantity contained in the supply shall be ascertained by means of a correct meter, and the licensee shall, if required by the consumer, cause the consumer to be supplied with such a meter: Provided that the licensee may require the consumer to give him security for the price of a meter and enter into an agreement for the hire thereof, unless the consumer elects to purchase a meter.

(2) Where the consumer so enters into an agreement for the hire of a meter, the licensee shall keep the meter correct, and, in default of his doing so, the consumer shall, for so long as the default continues, cease to be liable to pay for the hire of the meter. (

(3) Where the meter is the property of the consumer, he shall keep the meter correct and, in default of his doing so, the licensee may, after giving him seven days’ notice, for so long as the default continues, cease to supply energy through the meter. 

(4) The licensee or any person duly authorised by the licensee shall, at any reasonable time and on informing the consumer of his intention, have access to and be at liberty to inspect and test, and for that purpose, if he thinks fit, take off and remove, any meter referred to in sub-section (1); and, except where the meter is so hired as aforesaid, all reasonable expenses of, and incidental to, such inspecting, testing, taking off and removing shall, if the meter is found to be otherwise than correct, be recovered from the consumer, and, where any difference or dispute arises as to the amount of such reasonable expenses, the matter shall be referred to an Electrical Inspector, and the decision of such Inspector shall be final:

        Provided that the licensee shall not be at liberty to take off or remove any such meter if any difference or dispute of the nature described in sub-section (6) has arisen until the matter has been determined as therein provided.

(5) A consumer shall not connect any meter referred to in sub-section (1) with any electric supply-line through which energy is supplied by a licensee, or disconnect the same from any such electric supply-line, but he may by giving not less than forty-eight hours’ notice in writing to the licensee require the licensee to connect or disconnect such meter and on receipt of any such requisition the licensee shall comply with it within the period of the notice.

 (6) Where any difference or dispute arises as to whether any meter referred to in sub-section (1) is or is not correct, the matter shall be decided, upon the application of either party, by an Electrical Inspector; and where the meter has, in the opinion of such Inspector ceased to be correct, such Inspector shall estimate the amount of the energy supplied to the consumer or the electrical quantity contained in the supply, during such time, not exceeding six months, as the meter shall not, in the opinion of such Inspector, have been correct; but save as aforesaid, the register of the meter shall, in the absence of fraud, be conclusive proof of such amount or quantity:

      Provided that before either a licensee or a consumer applies to the Electrical Inspector under this sub-section, he shall give to the other party not less than seven days’ notice of his intention so to do.

(7) In addition to any meter which may be placed upon the premises of a consumer in pursuance of the provisions of sub-section (1), the licensee may place upon such premises such meter, maximum demand indicator or other apparatus as he may think fit for the purpose of ascertaining or regulating either the amount of energy supplied to the consumer, or the number of hours during which the supply is given, or the rate per unit of time at which energy is supplied to the consumer, or any other quantity or time connected with the supply:

         Provided that the meter, indicator or apparatus shall not, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary be placed otherwise than between the distributing mains of the licensee and any meter referred to in sub-section (1):

         Provided also that, where the charges for the supply of energy depend wholly or partly upon the reading or indication of any such meter, indicator or apparatus as aforesaid, the licensee shall, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, keep the meter, indicator or apparatus correct; and the provisions of sub-sections (4), (5) and (6) shall in that case apply as though the meter, indicator or apparatus were a meter referred to in subsection (1).

Explanation.—A meter shall be deemed to be “correct” if it registers the amount of energy supplied, or the electrical quantity contained in the supply, within the prescribed limits of error, and a maximum demand indicator or other apparatus referred to in sub-section (7) shall be deemed to be “correct” if it complies with such conditions as may be prescribed in the case of any such indicator or other apparatus.”

“CHAPTER – IV

METERS

54. Initial power supply shall not be given without a correct meter. Meters will be installed at the point of supply or at a suitable place as the engineer may decide. The same shall be fixed preferably in the basement or ground floor in multistoried buildings where it will be easily accessible for reading and inspection at any time. The consumer shall run his wiring from such point of supply and shall be responsible for the safety of the meter or metering equipment on his premises from theft, damage or interference.
x x x

56. The meters and associated equipment shall be properly sealed by the engineer and consumer’s acknowledgement obtained. The seals, nameplates, distinguishing numbers or marks affixed on the said equipment or apparatus shall not be interfered with, broken, removed or erased by the consumer. The meter, metering equipment, etc. shall on no account be handled or removed by any one except under the authority of the engineer. The engineer can do so in the presence of the consumer or his representative. An acknowledgement shall be taken from the consumer or his representative when seal is broken.
x x x

64. If a meter or metering equipment has been found to have been tampered or there is resistance by the consumer to the replacement of obsolete or defective meters by the engineer, the engineer may disconnect the supply after giving seven clear days show cause notice and opportunity to the consumer to submit his representation.
x x x

Penal Charges –

105. (1) On detection of unauthorised use in any manner by a consumer, the load connected in excess of the authorized load shall be treated as unauthorised load. The quantum of unauthorised consumption shall be determined in the same ratio as the unauthorised load stands to the authorised load.

(2) The period of unauthorised use shall be determined by the engineer as one year prior to the date of detection or from the date of initial supply if the initial date of supply is less than one year from the date of detection. If the consumer provides evidence to the contrary, the period may be varied according to such evidence. The engineer may levy penal charges in addition to the normal charges for aforesaid period of unauthorised use. Where addition of the unauthorised installation or sale or diversion would result in a reclassification according to this Code, the whole of the power drawn shall be deemed to have been drawn in the reclassified category. The consumer shall also be required to execute a fresh agreement under the reclassified category.

(3) The penal energy charges for unauthorised use of power shall be two times the charges applicable to the particular category of consumer.

(4) The penal demand charges for unauthorised use of power in cases covered under two part tariff shall be calculated on un-authorised connected load expressed in KVA multiplied by two times the rate of demand charges applicable.
x x x

CHAPTER – XII

CONSUMER PROTECTION

110. (1) A consumer aggrieved by any action or lack of action by the engineer under this Code may file a representation within one year of such action or lack of action to the designated authority of the licensee, above the rank of engineer who shall pass final orders on such a representation within thirty days of receipt of the representation.

(2) A consumer aggrieved by the decision or lack of decision of the designated authority of the licensee may file a representation within forty five days to the chief executive officer of the licensee who shall pass final orders on such a representation within forty five days of receipt of the representation.

(3) In respect of orders or lack of orders of the chief executive officer of the licensee on matters provided under Section 33 of the Act, the consumer may make a reference to the Commission under Section 37(1) of the Act.
x x x

Overriding effect –

115. (1) The provisions of this Code shall override the provisions of OSEB (General Condition of Supply) Regulation, 1995.

(2) Nothing contained in this Code shall have effect, in so far as it is inconsistent with the provisions of Indian Electricity Act, 1910, Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and Rules framed thereunder as amended by the Act.”

7.    Therefore, it would be evident from Section 26(6) which carves out an exception, that where there is an allegation of “fraud”, the same provision is not attracted. He further contended that invariably a plea is being taken by the consumer found to have committed theft of electricity that his meter was defective. In the instant case, in accordance with Section 26(4), an inspection was conducted in the presence of the representative of the respondent. If the meter is found to be defective on such inspection and if the respondent was desirous of availing the benefit of Section 26(6), it is the duty of the consumer under the said Section to move an application before the Electrical Inspector for getting the meter tested.

8.   It was submitted that the Orissa Electricity Regulatory Commission (for short “OERC”) by virtue of Section 54 of the Orissa Electricity Reforms Act, 1995 has framed a Code on different issues including the manner in which theft of energy is to be determined. They are statutory in character. Accordingly, he submitted that the High Court has erred in dealing with the matter without taking into account the clauses of the Code which are framed to deal with the theft of electricity. Factually also, the  High Court was incorrect in recording that the inspection was conducted in the absence of the consumer. It is further submitted that the decision relied on by the High Court is totally inapplicable in the facts and circumstances of this case since Belwal Spinning Mills Ltd. v. U.P. State Electricity Board 1997 (6) SCC 740 did not deal with the Code of 1998 framed by the Orissa Electricity Regulatory Commission and the distinguishable feature of the said decision is that the said decision made it clear that when there is an allegation of fraud or tampering of meter, Section 26(6) of the Act of 1910 has no application. Learned counsel further relied upon the decision in Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board & Ors. v. Smt. Basantibai 1988 (1) SCC 23 and drew our attention to paragraph 9 of the said decision and contended that Section 6(6) of the Act of 1910 has no application where there is a dispute regarding the commission of fraud in tampering with the meter and breaking the body seal is totally outside the ambit of Section 26(6) of the said Act. It is further contended that after the inspection was conducted in the presence of the representative of the consumer, details of the illegalities found on such inspection were shared with the respondent consumer, resulting in receipt of a vague reply from the consumer and was processed to raise a demand by way of a penal bill. Therefore, according to him, the requirement under the law was followed before issuance of the said penal bill. He further pointed out that on being aggrieved by such decision, the writ petitioner/respondent could have followed the statutory remedy as envisaged under Section 110 of the Code. It is further stated that the High Court did not even give any reason for the direction to refund the delayed payment surcharge.

9.    In these circumstances, it is submitted that the order of the High Court cannot be sustained under the provisions of law. The penal bill was quashed only on the ground that the unit of the respondent was closed. Such fact is immaterial and irrelevant in respect of demand of a penal bill. The approach of the High Court is patently erroneous.

10.       Per contra, it is submitted on behalf of the respondent that the argument of the appellant could have succeeded if the appellant could prove that the respondent had indulged in theft of electricity. It is pointed out that on October 10, 2002, the High Court directed the respondent to deposit 30,000/- without prejudice and for restoration of power supply since the electricity was disconnected on October 5, 2002. The power supply was restored on deposit of 10,000/- and subsequently, the respondent further deposited a sum of 20,000/- in terms of the direction. It is submitted that in spite of the interim order passed by the High Court directing stay of realisation of the penal bill, the appellants went on charging delayed payment surcharge on the penal charges in monthly bills raised subsequently on the respondent. It is submitted that the meter had actually inherent defects as only the inner seal was broken but the outer seal was intact. It is true that the matter was not referred to Electrical Inspector. It is further stated that in case of a dispute between the Central Act and the State Act, Central Act will prevail upon the State Act.

11.        We have noticed the facts in this case. We have also considered the Sections of the Act of 1910 and it appears to us that Section 26 is relevant only when there is any difference or a dispute arises in connection with correctness of a meter, in that case the matter shall be decided, upon being applied by either party, by an Electrical Inspector and in the opinion of the Inspector if it is found that the meter is defective, the Inspector shall estimate the amount of energy supplied to the consumer or the electrical quantity contained in the supply during such time not exceeding six months but if there is a question of fraud in tampering with the meter, in that case there is no question of applicability of Section 26 of the said Act in such a matter. In the instance case, we have asked the learned counsel appearing for the respondent whether following Section 26(6), the respondent ever asked or applied for checking of the meter by the Electrical Inspector on the ground of defective meter. The answer was in the negative. Therefore, it shows that the ingredients of Section 26(6) were not followed by the respondent to meet the necessity of checking the meter in question in accordance with the said provision.

12.       We have further noticed that the inspection was made in the presence of the representative of the respondent who is a Manager of the said company and in his presence the meter was checked up and was found to be tampered with. We have also noticed that the plea of duress or coercion in signing the inspection report was raised by the respondent but in reality no allegation was made by the respondent before an appropriate authority excepting such bald allegations have been made before the writ court without any basis or evidence. Therefore that fact cannot have any bearings in deciding this matter. We cannot brush aside the said fact from the mind while dealing with the matter concerning tampering of meter. It appears to us that the said aspect has escaped the attention of the High Court and therefore, in our opinion, the High Court failed to appreciate the facts in their proper perspective. Therefore, on this ground, we find that the High Court has misconstrued the facts and the provisions of law in dealing with the matter. The provision of law which deals with tampering of metering equipments, i.e. clauses 56, 64 and 105 of the Code have not been considered by the High Court and in our opinion the High Court has failed to construe such provisions and erred in deciding the matter ignoring the said provisions. The High Court accepted the position submitted on behalf of the respondent/writ-petitioner that it was a case of defective meter and there is no question of any tampering with the meter in question. The High Court has failed to appreciate that the inspection was made and the fact of tampering of meter would appear from the inspection report and such inspection report was signed on behalf of the respondent/writ-petitioner. Therefore, the High Court ignoring the said fact, came to the conclusion without giving any reason, that the inspection report is bad and has erred in setting aside such inspection report. Hence, such findings of the High Court cannot be sustained.

13.       Therefore, in our opinion, the High Court was also wrong in not considering the rights of the appellant to raise penal charges on the respondent on the ground of unauthorised consumption by way of tampering the meter or metering equipment and has a right to raise penal bill in accordance with the provisions of Code. On this ground the High Court has erred in allowing the writ petition in favour of the respondent, quashing the penal charges and further the direction given to refund the amount. The said order is without any reason and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. Hence, the same is set aside.

14.       We have also noticed in Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board & Ors. v. Smt. Basantibai (supra), this Court held:

“9. It is evident from the provisions of this section that a dispute as to whether any meter referred to in sub-section (1) is or is not correct has to be decided by the Electrical Inspector upon application made by either of the parties. It is for the Inspector to determine whether the meter is correct or not and in case the Inspector is of the opinion that the meter is not correct he shall estimate the amount of energy supplied to the consumer or the electrical quantity contained in the supply during a period not exceeding six months and direct the consumer to pay the same. If there is an allegation of fraud committed by the consumer in tampering with the meter or manipulating the supply line or breaking the body seal of the meter resulting in not registering the amount of energy supplied to the consumer or the electrical quantity contained in the supply, such a dispute does not fall within the purview of subsection (6) of Section 26. Such a dispute regarding the commission of fraud in tampering with the meter and breaking the body seal is outside the ambit of Section 26(6) of the said Act. An Electrical Inspector has, therefore, no jurisdiction to decide such cases of fraud. It is only the dispute as to whether the meter is/is not correct or it is inherently defective or faulty not recording correctly the electricity consumed, that can be decided by the Electrica Inspector under the provisions of the said Act.”

In Sub-Divisional Officer (P), UHBVNL v. Dharam Pal 2006 (12) SCC 222, it appears to us that in case of tampering, there is no scope for reference to Electrical Inspector. It was held :

“9. In State of W.B. v. Rupa Ice Factory (P) Ltd. [2004 (10) SCC 635], it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 637, para 5) 

“5. As regards the second claim, namely, the claim for the period from December 1993 to December 1995, the finding of the High Court is that the Vigilance Squad had found that Respondent 1 had tapped the electric energy directly from the transformer to the LT distribution board bypassing the meter circuit. If that is so, we do not know as to why the High Court would go on to advert to Section 26 of the Electricity Act and direct reference to the Electrical Inspector for decision under Section 26(6). In two decisions of this Court in M.P Electricity Board v. Basantibai [1988 (1) SCC 23] and J.M.D. Alloys Ltd. v. Bihar SEB [2003 (5) SCC 226] it has been held that in cases of tampering or theft or pilferage of electricity, the demand raised falls outside the scope of Section 26 of the Electricity Act. If that is so, neither the limitation period mentioned in Section 26 of the Electricity Act nor the procedure for raising demand for electricity consumed would arise at all. In this view of the matter, that part of the order of the Division Bench of the High Court, directing that there should be a reference to the Electrical Inspector, shall stand set aside. In other respects the order of the High Court shall remain undisturbed. The appeal is allowed accordingly.”

15.        In these circumstances, in our opinion, the High Court was wrong in bringing the matter within the scope of the provision of Section 26(6) of the said Act, and further the High Court was totally wrong in appreciation of facts even on the question of inspection and stated that no representative was present at that point of time. On the contrary, admittedly the Manager of the respondent at the time of the inspection was present.

16.       In these circumstances, the appeals are allowed, the writ petitions filed by the respondent/writ-petitioner are dismissed and the order passed by the High Court is set aside.

....................................J.
(Gyan Sudha Misra)
; .....................................J.
Pinaki Chandra Ghose)

New Delhi
March 26, 2014.




Thursday, March 27, 2014

Deaf and dumb person is a competent witness - The omission of administration of oath or affirmation does not invalidate any evidence

Held :

To sum up, a deaf and dumb person is a competent witness. If in the opinion of the Court, oath can be administered to him/her, it should be so done. Such a witness, if able to read and write, it is desirable to record his statement giving him questions in writing and seeking answers in writing. In case the witness is not able to read and write, his statement can be recorded in sign language with the aid of interpreter, if found necessary. In case the interpreter is provided, he should be a person of the same surrounding but should not have any interest in the case and he should be administered oath.                                                                                                                        (Para21)

                                            

Language is much more than words. Like all other languages, communication by way of signs has some inherent limitations, since it may be difficult to comprehend what the user is attempting to convey. But a dumb person need not be prevented from being a credible and reliable witness merely due to his/her physical disability. Such a person though unable to speak may convey himself through writing if literate or through signs and gestures if he is unable to read and write.

                                                                                                                               (Para 20)




REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.8 70 of 2007

State of Rajasthan                                                            …..Appellant
Versus
Darshan Singh @ Darshan Lal                                    ….. Respondents

JUDGMENT :Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1.    This Criminal Appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 29.5.2006 in D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 96 of 2003 passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur setting aside the judgment and order dated 15.1.2003 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) Hanumangarh, convicting the respondent herein of the offences punishable under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred as `IPC’) and imposing the punishment to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- in default to further undergo one month simple imprisonment.

2.    Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:
A.     Buta Singh (PW.15) lodged an oral report on 4.5.2001 at 1.00 a.m. at P.S. Hanumangarh, District Hanumangarh stating that on intervening night between 3/4.5.2001 at about 12.15 a.m., Jaswant Singh (PW.1) received a telephone call from Dr. Amarjeet Singh Chawla (PW.4) to the effect that Jaswant Singh’s daughter was perturbed and, therefore, he must immediately reach the house of his son-in-law Kaku Singh. Buta Singh (PW.15), informant, also proceeded towards the house of Kaku Singh deceased, alongwith his son Gurmail Singh. They met Jaswant Singh (PW.1) and Geeta (PW.16), his daughter in the lane. The main door of the house was closed but the window of the door was open. They went inside through the window and found two cots lying on some distance where fresh blood was lying covered with sand. They also found the dead body of Kaku Singh in the pool of blood covered by a quilt in the room.

B.      On being asked, Geeta (PW.16) (deaf and dumb), wife of Kaku Singh deceased communicated by gestures that Darshan Singh, respondent-accused, had stayed with them in the night. He had given a pill with water to Kaku Singh and thus he became unconscious. Two more persons, accomplice of Darshan Singh came from outside and all the three persons inflicted injuries on Kaku Singh with sharp edged weapons. Geeta (PW.16) got scared and ran outside. The motive for committing the offence had been that one Chhindri Bhatni was having illicit relationship with Kaku Singh, deceased, and about 8-10 months prior to the date of incident Kaku Singh caused burn injuries to Geeta (PW.16) at the instigation of Chhindri Bhatni. However, because of the intervention of the community people, Kaku Singh, deceased, severed his relationship with Chhindri Bhatni, who became annoyed and had sent her brother Darshan Singh alongwith other persons who killed Kaku Singh.

C.      On the basis of the said report FIR No. 262 of 2001 was registered under Sections 449, 302, 201 and 120B IPC against the respondent at P.S Hanumangarh and investigation ensued. The respondent was arrested and during interrogation, he made a voluntary disclosure statement on the basis of which the I.O. got recovered a blood stained Kulhari and clothes the respondent was wearing at the time of commission of offence.

D.    After completion of the investigation, the police filed chargesheet against the respondent under Sections 302 and 201 IPC and the trial commenced. During the course of trial, the prosecution examined as many as 23 witnesses and tendered several documents in evidence. However, Geeta (PW.16) was the sole eye-witness of the occurrence, being deaf and dumb, her statement was recorded in sign language with the help of her father Jaswant Singh (PW.1) as an interpreter. After completion of all the formalities and conclusion of the trial, the trial court placed reliance upon the evidence of Geeta (PW.16) and recovery etc., and convicted the respondent vide judgment and order dated 15.1.2003 and imposed the punishment as mentioned here-in-above.

E.     Aggrieved, the respondent preferred Criminal Appeal No. 96 of 2003 before the High Court which has been allowed vide impugned judgment and order dated 29.5.2006.

Hence, this appeal.

3.    Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the appellant-State, has submitted that the prosecution case was fully supported by Geeta (PW.16), Jaswant Singh (PW.1) and Buta Singh (PW.15) which stood fully corroborated by the medical evidence. Dr. Rajendra Gupta (PW.17) proved the postmortem report and supported the case of the prosecution. Therefore, the High Court committed an error by reversing the well-reasoned judgment of the trial court. Thus, the appeal deserves to be allowed.

4.    Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent has opposed the appeal contending that the deposition of Geeta (PW.16) cannot be relied upon for the reason that she is deaf and dumb and her statement has not been recorded as per the requirement of the provisions of Section 119 of the Evidence Act, 1872. The deposition of Jaswant Singh (PW.1) cannot be relied upon as he was having an eye on the property of Kaku Singh, deceased. The High Court has considered the entire evidence and re-appreciated the same in correct perspective. There are fixed parameters for interfering with the order of acquittal which we do not fit in the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, the appeal is liable to be dismissed.

5.    We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. Undoubtedly, Kaku Singh, deceased, died a homicidal death. Dr. Rajendra Gupta (PW.17), who conducted the post-mortem examination on the dead body of Kaku Singh, found the following injuries:

(i)                 Incised wound 4-1/2” x 1” bone deep fracture on the right lateral side of face mandible region.
(ii)          Incised wound 5-1/2” x 2” bone deep all structure of neck cut wound.

He opined that the cause of death was injury to vessel of neck, trachea due to injury no. 2 which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

6.    The only question that remains for consideration is whether the respondent could be held responsible for causing the death of Kaku Singh, deceased.

       Geeta (PW.16) is the star witness of the prosecution. According to her at 6.30 p.m. on the day of incident, respondentaccused came to her house. The accused and her husband consumed liquor together. The respondent-accused had mixed a tablet in the glass of water and the same was taken by her husband Kaku Singh. She served the food to both of them and subsequently, all the three persons slept on cots in the same room. During the night two persons also joined the respondent-accused. It was at 11.30 p.m., accused Darshan Singh had taken out a kulhari from his bag and gave blows on the neck and cheek of her husband. She raised a cry but accused caught her by the hair and asked to keep quiet otherwise she would also be killed. The dead body was taken by the accused alongwith accompanying persons and was put in a room and locked the same from outside. In the court, Geeta (PW.16) witness indicated that she could read and write and she had written telephone number of her father Jaswant Singh (PW.1). It was on her request that Dr. Amarjeet Singh Chawla (PW.4) informed her father. After sometime, Jaswant Singh (PW.1) came there on scooter and saw the place of occurrence.

7.    Jaswant Singh (PW.1) deposed that he reached the place of occurrence after receiving the telephone call from Dr. Amarjeet Singh Chawla (PW.4) and after coming to know about the murder of Kaku Singh, he informed Buta Singh (PW.15), brother of deceased Kaku Singh. Jaswant Singh (PW.1) reached the clinic of Dr. Amarjeet Singh Chawla (PW.4), in the way, he met Buta Singh (PW.15) and his son Gurmail Singh. They came to the house of Kaku Singh, deceased and found the blood covered with sand and also the dead body of Kaku Singh lying on a cot in a room covered with quilt. Geeta (PW.16) informed him through gestures that respondent-accused Darshan Singh had killed him with kulhari while Kaku Singh was sleeping. She also told Jaswant Singh (PW.1) about the illicit relationship of Chhindri Bhatni with Kaku Singh, deceased and because of the intervention of community persons, Kaku Singh had severed relationship with Chhindri Bhatni. The latter got annoyed and got Kaku Singh killed through her brother Darshan Singh, respondent-accused.

8.    Buta Singh (PW.15), brother of deceased Kaku Singh, narrated the incident as had been stated by Jaswant Singh (PW.1).

9.    Dr. Rajendra Gupta, (PW.17), who conducted the postmortem on the said dead body supported the case of the prosecution to the extent that Kaku Singh, deceased, died of homicidal death.

10.        Gurtej Singh (PW.2) the recovery witness deposed about the inquest report of the dead body and taking in custody of empty strip of tablet, blood stained soil and simple soil and moulds etc. from the spot.

11.        Hari Singh (PW.7), the recovery witness of kulhari (Ext. P- 12) at the instance of respondent-accused Darshan Singh supported the prosecution case to the extent of the said recovery.

12.        Ramjilal (PW.23), Investigating Officer, gave full details of lodging an FIR at midnight and explained all steps taken during the investigation, recoveries referred to here-in-above, recording of statements of witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C., sending the recovered material for FSL report and arrest of Darshan Singh, respondent-accused etc.

13.        Dr. Amarjeet Singh Chawla (PW.4) deposed that Geeta (PW.16) had asked him to give a telephone call to her father and he had accordingly informed her father. After sometime, her father Jaswant Singh (PW.1) had arrived on scooter. In the crossexamination, he explained that Geeta (PW.16) was dumb and deaf, however, could read and write and she had written the telephone number of her father as 55172 and, thus, he could contact her father.

14.        The respondent-accused in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., denied all allegations. The trial court found the evidence on record trustworthy and in view thereof, convicted the respondent-accused and sentenced him as referred to hereinabove.

15.       The High Court re-appreciated the entire evidence and came to the following conclusions:

(I)           There were major contradictions in ocular evidence and medical evidence. As per the statement of Geeta (PW.16), Kaku Singh, deceased and Darshan Singh, respondent-accused had consumed liquor in the evening but this was not corroborated from medical evidence. Dr. Rajendra Gupta (PW.17) has admitted that there was nothing to show that deceased Kaku Singh had consumed liquor. Her version of giving a pill for intoxication of deceased could not be proved by medical evidence. The viscera was sent to Forensic Science Laboratory but the report did not show that any sort of poison had been administered to the deceased.

(II)          The version of Geeta (PW.16) did not appear to be trustworthy as she deposed that Darshan Singh accused, Kaku Singh deceased and the witness had slept in the same room. It was natural that a husband and wife would not allow a stranger to sleep with them, even if Darshan Singh, accused, was known to them. In view of the fact that relationship between Geeta and Chhindri Bhatni had never been cordial, it could not be believed that Geeta (PW.16) would permit the brother of Chhindri Bhatni to sleep with them.

(III)        Geeta (PW.16) had admitted in her cross-examination that Chhindri Bhatni had 10 brothers and none of them had ever visited her house. Chhindri Bhatni was living in the same house with deceased and Geeta. She further admitted that she had never seen Darshan Singh, respondent-accused, prior to the date of incident. Even, she could not disclose the features of the accused to the police. In such a fact-situation, the question of sleeping all of them together could not arise.

(IV)      There could be no motive for Darshan Singh, respondentaccused, to kill Kaku Singh, deceased for the reason that even as per deposition of Geeta (PW.16), Kaku Singh had severed the relationship with Chhindri Bhatni long ago.

(V)        The name of Darshan Singh, respondent-accused, did not find place in the FIR. The accused persons had been mentioned therein as Chhindri Bhatni and her brother.

(VI)      So far as the recovery of kulhari (Ext. P-12) is concerned, even if believed, did not lead to any interference for the simple reason that FSL report (Ext. P-64) revealed that there was no human blood found on kulhari. Therefore, the evidence of recovery of kulhari could not be used as incriminating circumstance against the accused.

(VII)      The evidence on record revealed that Geeta (PW.16) and Jaswant Singh (PW.1) were apprehending that Kaku Singh deceased would alienate his irrigated land to Chhindri Bhatni and, therefore, it became doubtful whether Darshan Singh, respondent/accused could have any motive to kill Kaku Singh, deceased.

(VIII)   The evidence of Geeta (PW.16) was recorded in sign language with the help of her father Jaswant Singh (PW.1). Admittedly, neither she nor her father while acting as her interpreter had been administered oath. The signs have been recorded alongwith its interpretation. There was possibility of misinterpretation of the signs made by her, as her father could do it purposely, the statement of Geeta (PW.16) did not inspire confidence.

(IX)      Deposition of Geeta (PW.16) could not be relied upon as it was not safe for the court to embark upon the examination of deaf and dumb witness, on her information without the help of an expert or a person familiar of her mode of conveying ideas to others in day to day life. Further, such a person should not be an interested person. In the instant case, Jaswant Singh (PW.1) had participated in the investigation and was an interested person.

16.        We have also gone through the entire evidence and concur with the findings recorded by the High Court.

        Basic argument which has been advanced by both the parties before us is on the admissibility and credibility of sole eye-witness Geeta (PW.16).
        Admittedly, Geeta (PW.16) had not been administered oath, nor Jaswant Singh (PW.1), her father who acted as interpreter when her statement was recorded in the court. In view of provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the Oaths Act, 1969, it is always desirable to administer oath or statement may be recorded on affirmation of the witness. This Court in Rameshwar S/o Kalyan Singh v. The State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54, has categorically held that the main purpose of administering of oath to render persons who give false evidence liable to prosecution and further to bring home to the witness the solemnity of the occasion and to impress upon him the duty of speaking the truth, further such matters only touch credibility and not admissibility.

       However, in view of the provisions of Section 7 of the Oaths Act, 1969, the omission of administration of oath or affirmation does not invalidate any evidence.

17.        In M.P. Sharma & Ors. v. Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi & Ors., AIR 1954 SC 300, this Court held that a person can “be a witness” not merely by giving oral evidence but also by producing documents or making intelligible gestures as in the case of a dumb witness (See Section 119 of the Evidence Act) or the like.

18.       The object of enacting the provisions of Section 119 of the Evidence Act reveals that deaf and dumb persons were earlier contemplated in law as idiots. However, such a view has subsequently been changed for the reason that modern science revealed that persons affected with such calamities are generally found more intelligent, and to be susceptible to far higher culture than one was once supposed. When a deaf and dumb person is examined in the court, the court has to exercise due caution and take care to ascertain before he is examined that he possesses the requisite amount of intelligence and that he understands the nature of an oath. On being satisfied on this, the witness may be administered oath by appropriate means and that also be with the assistance of an interpreter. However, in case a person can read and write, it is most desirable to adopt that method being more satisfactory than any sign language. The law required that there must be a record of signs and not the interpretation of signs.

19.       In Meesala Ramakrishan v. State of A.P., (1994) 4 SCC 182, this Court has considered the evidentiary value of a dying declaration recorded by means of signs and nods of a person who is not in a position to speak for any reason and held that the same amounts to a verbal statement and, thus, is relevant and admissible. The Court further clarified that `verbal’ statement does not amount to `oral’ statement. In view of the provisions of Section 119 of the Evidence Act, the only requirement is that witness may give his evidence in any manner in which he can make it intelligible, as by writing or by signs and such evidence can be deemed to be oral evidence within the meaning of Section 3 of the Evidence Act. Signs and gestures made by nods or head are admissible and such nods and gestures are not only admissible but possess evidentiary value.

20.       Language is much more than words. Like all other languages, communication by way of signs has some inherent limitations, since it may be difficult to comprehend what the user is attempting to convey. But a dumb person need not be prevented from being a credible and reliable witness merely due to his/her physical disability. Such a person though unable to speak may convey himself through writing if literate or through signs and gestures if he is unable to read and write.

      A case in point is the silent movies which were understood widely because they were able to communicate ideas to people through novel signs and gestures. Emphasised body language and facial expression enabled the audience to comprehend the intended message.

21.        To sum up, a deaf and dumb person is a competent witness. If in the opinion of the Court, oath can be administered to him/her, it should be so done. Such a witness, if able to read and write, it is desirable to record his statement giving him questions in writing and seeking answers in writing. In case the witness is not able to read and write, his statement can be recorded in sign language with the aid of interpreter, if found necessary. In case the interpreter is provided, he should be a person of the same surrounding but should not have any interest in the case and he should be administered oath.

22.        In the instant case, there is sufficient material on record that Geeta (PW.16) was able to read and write and this fact stood proved in the trial court when she wrote the telephone number of her father. We fail to understand as to why her statement could not be recorded in writing, i.e., she could have been given the questions in writing and an opportunity to reply the same in writing.

23.       Be that as it may, her statement had been recorded with the help of her father as an interpreter, who for the reasons given by the High Court, being an interested witness who had assisted during the trial, investigation and was examined without administering oath, made the evidence unreliable. In such a fact-situation, the High Court has rightly given the benefit of doubt and acquitted the respondent.

24.       We are fully aware of our limitation to interfere with an order against acquittal. In exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.

25.        If we examine the judgment of the High Court in light of the aforesaid legal proposition, we do not find it to be a fit case to interfere with the order of acquittal.

The appeal lacks merit and, is accordingly, dismissed.

………………………..J.
(Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)
………………………..J.
(DIPAK MISRA)
New Delhi,
May 21, 2012