Thus, we are of the
view that judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to a writ of
certiorari under Article 226. We are also in agreement with the view of the
referring Bench that a writ of mandamus does not lie against a private person
not discharging any public duty. Scope of Article 227 is different from Article
226.
“(i) Judicial orders of
civil court are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution;
(ii) Jurisdiction under
Article 227 is distinct from jurisdiction from jurisdiction under Article 226. Contrary
view in Surya
Dev Rai is
overruled.”
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2548 OF 2009
RADHEY SHYAM & ANR. …APPELLANTS
VERSUS
CHHABI NATH & ORS. …RESPONDENTS
WITH
SLP (C) NO.25828 OF 2013
JAGDISH PRASAD …PETITIONER
VERSUS
IQBAL KAUR & ORS. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T : ADARSH KUMAR GOEL J.
1.
This matter has been placed before the Bench of three
Judges in pursuance of an order dated April 15, 2009 passed by the bench of two
Hon’ble Judges to consider the correctness of the law laid down by this Court
in Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai and others
(2003 (6) SCC 675) that an order of
civil court was amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution. The reference order, inter alia, reads:-
30. ………Therefore,
this Court unfortunately is in disagreement with the view which has been
expressed in Surya Dev Rai
insofar as
correction of or any interference with judicial orders of civil court by a writ
of certiorari is concerned.
31. Under Article 227 of the Constitution,
the High Court does not issue a writ of certiorari. Article 227 of the
Constitution vests the High Courts with a power of superintendence which is to
be very sparingly exercised to keep tribunals and courts within the bounds of
their authority. Under Article 227, orders of both civil and criminal courts
can be examined only in very exceptional cases when manifest miscarriage of
justice has been occasioned. Such power, however, is not to be exercised to
correct a mistake of fact and of law.
32. The essential distinctions in the
exercise of power between Articles 226 and 227 are well known and pointed out
in Surya Dev Rai
and with that we
have no disagreement. But we are unable to agree with the legal proposition
laid down in Surya Dev Rai
that judicial
orders passed by a civil court can be examined and then corrected/reversed by
the writ court under Article 226 in exercise of its power under a writ of
certiorari. We are of the view that the aforesaid proposition laid down in Surya Dev Rai, is contrary to the ratio in Mirajkar and the ratio in Mirajkar has not been overruled in Rupa Ashok Hurra [2002 (4) SCC 388].
33. In view of our difference of opinion
with the views expressed in Surya Dev Rai, matter may be placed before His Lordship the Hon’ble
the Chief Justice of India for constituting a larger Bench, to consider the
correctness or otherwise of the law laid down in Surya Dev Rai on the question discussed above.”
2. Since this Bench has to decide the referred question, it is not necessary
to mention the facts of the case in detail. Suffice it to say that assailing an
interim order of civil court in a pending suit, the defendant-respondent filed
a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court and the High Court having
vacated the said interim order granted in favour of the plaintiff-appellant,
the appellant moved this Court by way of a special leave petition, inter
alia, contending that the writ petition under Article 226 was not
maintainable against the order of the civil court and, thus, the impugned order
could not be passed by the High Court. On behalf of the respondent, reliance
was placed on the decision of this Court in Surya Dev Rai laying
down that a writ petition under Article 226 was maintainable against the order
of the civil court and thus it was submitted that the High Court was justified
in passing the impugned order.
3. As already mentioned, the Bench of two Hon’ble Judges who heard the matter
was not persuaded to follow the law laid down in Surya Dev Rai.
It was observed that the judgment in Surya Dev Rai did not
correctly appreciate the ratio in the earlier Nine Judge judgment of this Court
in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar and others vs. State of
Maharashtra(AIR 1967 SC 1 = 1966 (3)
SCR 744) wherein this Court came to the conclusion that “Certiorari
does not lie to quash the judgments of inferior courts of civil jurisdiction
(para 63)”.With reference to the observations in Surya Dev Rai for
not following the conclusion in Mirajkar, the referring Bench
inter alia observed:
“25. In our view the appreciation of the
ratio in Mirajkar by the learned Judges, in Surya Dev Rai, with great respect, was possibly a
little erroneous and with that we cannot agree.
26. The two-Judge Bench in Surya Dev Rai did not, as obviously it could not
overrule the ratio in Mirajkar, a Constitution Bench decision of a nine- Judge Bench.
But the learned Judges justified their different view in Surya Dev Rai, inter alia on the ground that the
law relating to certiorari changed both in England and in India. In support of
that opinion, the learned Judges held that the statement of law in Halsbury, on
which the ratio in Mirajkar is based, has
been changed and in support of that quoted paras 103 and 109 from Halsbury’s
Laws of England, 4th Edn. (Reissue), Vol. 1(1). Those paras are set out below:
“103. The
prerogative remedies of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus: historical
development.—Historically, prohibition was a writ whereby the royal courts of
common law prohibited other courts from entertaining matters falling within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the common law courts; certiorari was issued to bring
the record of an inferior court into the King’s Bench for review or to remove indictments
for trial in that court; mandamus was directed to inferior courts and
tribunals, and to public officers and bodies, to order the performance of a public
duty. All three were called prerogative writs;…
* * *
109. The nature
of certiorari and prohibition.—Certiorari lies to bring decisions of an
inferior court, tribunal, public authority or any other body of persons before
the High Court for review so that the court may determine whether they should
be quashed, or to quash such decisions. The order of prohibition is an order
issuing out of the High Court and directed to an inferior court or tribunal or public
authority which forbids that court or tribunal or authority to act in excess of
its jurisdiction or contrary to law. Both certiorari and prohibition are
employed for the control of inferior courts, tribunals and public authorities.”
The aforesaid
paragraphs are based on general principles which are older than the time when Mirajkar was decided are still good. Those principles
nowhere indicate that judgments of an inferior civil court of plenary
jurisdiction are amenable to correction by a writ of certiorari. In any event,
change of law in England cannot dilute the binding nature of the ratio in Mirajkar and which has not been overruled and
is holding the field for decades.
27. It is clear from the law laid down in Mirajkar in para 63 that a distinction has been
made between judicial orders of inferior courts of civil jurisdiction and
orders of inferior tribunals or court which are not civil courts and which
cannot pass judicial orders. Therefore, judicial orders passed by civil courts
of plenary jurisdiction stand on a different footing in view of the law pronounced
in para 63 in Mirajkar. The passage in the subsequent
edition of Halsbury (4th Edn.) which has been quoted in Surya Dev Rai does not show at all that there has
been any change in law on the points in issue pointed out above.
28. The learned Judges in Surya Dev Rai stated in SCC para 18, p. 687 of the
Report that the decision rendered in Mirajkar was considered by the Constitution Bench in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra and wherein the learned Judges took a
different view and in support of that, the following para from Rupa Ashok Hurra has been quoted: (Surya Dev Rai case, SCC pp. 687-88, para 18)
“(i) that it is a well-settled
principle that the technicalities associated with the prerogative writs in
English law have no role to play under our constitutional scheme; (ii) that a
writ of certiorari to call for records and examine the same for passing
appropriate orders, is issued by a superior court to an inferior court which certifies
its records for examination; and (iii) that a High Court cannot issue a writ to
another High Court, nor can one Bench of a High Court issue a writ to a
different Bench of the High Court; much less can the writ jurisdiction of a
High Court be invoked to seek issuance of a writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court. The High Courts are not constituted as inferior courts in our
constitutional scheme.”
29. We are constrained to point out again
that in Rupa Ashok
Hurra the Constitution
Bench did not take any view which is contrary to the views expressed in Mirajkar. On the other hand, the ratio in Mirajkar was referred to with respect and was
relied on in Rupa Ashok
Hurra. Mirajkar was referred to in SCC para 8, p. 399
and again in SCC para 11 on p. 402 and again in SCC para 59, p. 418 and also in
SCC para 60, p. 419 of Rupa Ashok Hurra. Nowhere even any whisper of a divergence from the ratio
in Mirajkar was expressed. Rather passages from Mirajkar have been quoted with approval.
30. In fact the question which was
referred to the Constitution Bench in Rupa Ashok Hurra is quoted in para 1 of the judgment
and it is clear from the perusal of the said paragraph that the question for
consideration in Rupa Ashok Hurra was totally different. Therefore, this Court unfortunately
is in disagreement with the view which has been expressed in Surya Dev Rai insofar as correction of or any
interference with judicial orders of civil court by a writ of certiorari is
concerned.”
4. Thus, the question to be decided is whether the view taken in Surya
Dev Rai that a writ lies under Article 226 of the Constitution against
the order of the civil court, which has been doubted in the reference order, is
the correct view.
5. We have heard learned counsel for
the parties. We have also heard learned counsel for the petitioner in SLP (C)
No.25828 of 2013 as the said SLP was tagged to the present appeal and also the
intervenor in person in I.A. No.2 of 2011.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the view taken in the
referring order deserves to be approved for the reasons given in the said order
and contrary view in Surya Dev Rai may be overruled. It is submitted
that the bench of nine Judges in Mirajkar has categorically held
that the order of the civil court was not amenable to writ jurisdiction under
Article 226 and the said view still holds the field. The reasons for not
following the said view in Surya Dev Rai are not sound in law.
This submission is supported by learned counsel for the petitioner appearing in
SLP (Civil) No.25828 of 2013 as also by the Intervenor in person.
7. On the contrary, learned senior counsel for the respondent supported the
view taken in Surya Dev Rai which is based on decisions of this
Court relied upon therein. According to him, the scope of writ jurisdiction was
wide enough to extend to an order of the civil court. There was no reason to
exclude the civil courts from the expression “any person or authority”
in Article 226 of the Constitution. Conceptually, a writ of certiorari could be
issued by a superior court to an inferior court. He also pointed out that
though the judgment in Surya Dev Rai is by a Bench of two judges,
the same has been referred with approval in larger bench judgments in Shail
vs. Manoj Kumar (2004 (4) SCC 785, Mahendra Saree
Emporium (II) vs. G.V. Srinivasa Murthy (2005 (1) SCC
481) and Salem Advocate Bar Assn(II) vs. Union of India
(2005 (6) SCC 344) and on that ground
correctness of the said view is not open to be considered by this Bench.
8. We have given anxious consideration to the rival submissions.
9. It will be appropriate to refer to
some of the leading judgments of this Court on the scope of writ jurisdiction
in the present context, including those referred to in Surya Dev Rai and
the referring order.
10.
In T.C.
Basappa vs. T. Nagappa (AIR 1954 SC 440= (1955) 1 SCR
250) , question before this Court was as to the scope of jurisdiction under
Article 226 in dealing with a writ of certiorari against the order of the
Election Tribunal. This Court considered the question in the background of
principles followed by superior courts in England which generally formed the
basis of decisions of Indian Courts. This Court held that while broad and fundamental
norms regulating exercise of writ jurisdiction had to be kept in mind, it was
not necessary for Indian Courts to look back to the early history or procedural
technicalities of the writ jurisdiction in England in view of express
constitutional provisions. Certiorari was meant to supervise “judicial acts”
which included quasi judicial functions of administrative bodies. The Court
issuing such writ quashed patently erroneous and without jurisdiction order but
the Court did not review the evidence as an appellate court nor substituted its
own finding for that of the inferior Tribunal. Since the said judgment is
followed in all leading judgments, relevant observations therein may be extracted
:
“5. The principles upon which the superior
courts in England interfere by issuing writs of certiorari are fairly well
known and they have generally formed the basis of decisions in our Indian
courts. It is true that there is lack of uniformity even in the pronouncements
of English Judges, with regard to the grounds upon which a writ, or, as it is
now said, an order of certiorari, could issue, but such differences of opinion
are unavoidable in Judge-made law which has developed through a long course of years.
As is well known, the issue of the prerogative writs, within which certiorari
is included, had their origin in England in the King's prerogative power of
superintendence over the due observance of law by his officials and tribunals.
The writ of certiorari is so named because in its original form it required
that the King should be “certified of” the proceedings to be investigated and
the object was to secure by the authority of a superior court, that the jurisdiction
of the inferior Tribunal should be properly exercised [Vide Ryots of Garabandho
v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi 70IA 129. These principles were transplanted to
other parts of the King's dominions. In India, during the British days, the
three chartered High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras were alone competent
to issue writs and that too within specified limits and the power was not exercisable
by the other High Courts at all. “In that situation” as this court observed in
Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao [(1953) SCR 1144]
“the makers of the Constitution having
decided to provide for certain basic safeguards for the people in the new set up,
which they called fundamental rights, evidently thought it necessary to provide
also a quick and inexpensive remedy for the enforcement of such rights and, finding
that the prerogative writs, which the courts in England had developed and used
whenever urgent necessity demanded immediate and decisive interposition, were
peculiarly suited for the purpose, they conferred, in the States' sphere, new
and wide powers on the High Courts of issuing directions, orders, or writs
primarily for the enforcement of fundamental rights, the power to issue such
directions ‘for any other purpose' being also included with a view apparently
to place all the High Courts in this country in somewhat the same position as
the Court of King's Bench in England.”
6. The language used in Articles 32 and
226 of our Constitution is very wide and the powers of the Supreme Court as
well as of all the High Courts in India extend to issuing of orders, writs or
directions including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo
warranto, prohibition and certiorari as may be considered necessary for
enforcement of the fundamental rights and in the case of the High Courts, for other
purposes as well. In view of the express provisions in our Constitution we need
not now look back to the early history or the procedural technicalities of
these writs in English law, nor feel oppressed by any difference or change of opinion
expressed in particular cases by English Judges. We can make an order or issue
a writ in the nature of certiorari in all appropriate cases and in appropriate manner,
so long as we keep to the broad and fundamental principles that regulate the
exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of granting such writs in English law.
7. One of the fundamental principles in
regard to the issuing of a writ of certiorari, is, that the writ can be availed
of only to remove or adjudicate on the validity of judicial acts. The expression
“judicial acts” includes the exercise of quasi-judicial functions by
administrative bodies or other authorities or persons obliged to exercise such
functions and is used in contrast with what are purely ministerial acts. Atkin,
L.J. thus summed up the law on this point in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners
(1924) 1 KB 171]:
“Whenever anybody or persons having legal
authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and having
the duty to act judicially act in excess of their legal authority, they are subject
to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division exercised in these
writs.”
The second
essential feature of a writ of certiorari is that the control which is
exercised through it over judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals or bodies is not
in an appellate but supervisory capacity. In granting a writ of certiorari the superior
court does not exercise the powers of an appellate tribunal. It does not review
or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal
purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without
jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for
those of the inferior tribunal. The offending order or proceeding so to say is
put out of the way as one which should not be used to the detriment of any
person [Vide Per Lord Cairns in walshall’s Overseers vs. London and North Western
Railway Co. 4 AC 30, 39].
8. The supervision of the superior court exercised
through writs of certiorari goes on two points, as has been expressed by Lord
Summer in King v. Nat Bell Liquors Limited [(1922) 2 AC 128, 156]. One is the
area of inferior jurisdiction and the qualifications and conditions of its exercise;
the other is the observance of law in the course of its exercise. These two
heads normally cover all the grounds on which a writ of certiorari could be
demanded. In fact there is little difficulty in the enunciation of the principles;
the difficulty really arises in applying the principles to the facts of a
particular case.
9. Certiorari may lie and is generally
granted when a court has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. The
want of jurisdiction may arise from the nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding
or from the absence of some preliminary proceeding or the court itself may not
be legally constituted or suffer from certain disability by reason of
extraneous circumstances [Vide Halsbury, 2 Edn. Vol IX]. When the jurisdiction
of the court depends upon the existence of some collateral fact, it is well settled
that the court cannot by a wrong decision of the fact give it jurisdiction
which it would not otherwise possess [Vide Banbury vs. Fuller, 9 Exch 111; R.
v. Income Tax Special Purposes Commissioners, 21 QBD 313].
10. A tribunal may be competent to enter
upon an enquiry but in making the enquiry it may act in flagrant disregard of
the rules of procedure or where no particular procedure is prescribed, it may
violate the principles of natural justice. A writ of certiorari may be
available in such cases. An error in the decision or determination itself may
also be amenable to a writ of certiorari but it must be a manifest error apparent
on the face of the proceedings, e.g. when it is based on clear ignorance or
disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error which
can be corrected by certiorari but not a mere wrong decision. The essential
features of the remedy by way of certiorari have been stated with remarkable
brevity and clearness by Morris, L.J. in the recent case of Rex v.
Northumberland Compensation Appellate Tribunal [ (1952) 1 KB 338]. The Lord
Justice says:
“It is plain that certiorari will not
issue as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. It does not lie in order to bring
up an order or decision for re-hearing of the issue raised in the proceedings.
It exists to correct error of law when revealed on the face of an order or
decision or irregularity or absence of or excess of jurisdiction when shown.”
11. In dealing with the powers of the High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court has expressed itself in
almost similar terms [ Vide Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd. (1952)
SCR 583] and said:
“Such writs as are referred to in
Article 226 are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in
grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly
without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of
natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there
is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission, error
or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. However extensive the jurisdiction
may be, it seems to us that it is not so wide or large as to enable the High
Court to convert itself into a court of appeal and examine for itself the
correctness of the decision impugned and decide what is the proper view to be
taken or the order to be made.”
These passages indicate with
sufficient fullness the general principles that govern the exercise of
jurisdiction in the matter of granting writs of certiorari under Article 226 of
the Constitution”.
11.
It is necessary to
clarify that expression “judicial acts” is not meant to refer to judicial
orders of civil courts as the matter before this Court arose out of the order
of Election Tribunal and no direct decision of this Court, except Surya Devi
Rai, has been brought to our notice where writ of certiorari may have
been issued against an order of a judicial court. In fact, when the question as
to scope of jurisdiction arose in subsequent decisions, it was clarified that
orders of judicial courts stood on different footing from the quasi judicial
orders of authorities or Tribunals.
12. In Ujjam Bai vs. State of
U.P.(AIR 1962 SC 1621 = (1963) 1 SCR 778), matter was referred to a
Bench of seven Judges on the scope of writ of certiorari against an order of
assessment under the provisions of Sales Tax law passed in violation of a
fundamental right. Majority of six judges took the view that except an order under
a void law or an ‘ultra vires’ or ‘without jurisdiction’ order,
there could be no violation of fundamental right by a quasi judicial order or a
statutory authority and such order could not be challenged under Article 32. A
writ of certiorari could however, lie against a patently erroneous order under Article
226. It was observed that judicial orders of Courts stood on different footing.
Ayyangar, J. observed :
“Before concluding it is necessary to
advert to one matter which was just touched on in the course of the arguments
as one which might be reserved for consideration when it actually arose, and
this related to the question whether the decision or order of a regular
ordinary Court of law as distinguished from a tribunal or quasijudicial authority
constituted or created under particular statutes could be complained of as violating
a fundamental right. It is a salutary principle that this Court should not
pronounce on points which are not involved in the questions raised before it
and that is the reason why I am not dealing with it in any fullness and am
certainly not expressing any decided opinion on it. Without doing either
however, I consider it proper to make these observations. There is not any
substantial identity between a Court of law adjudicating on the rights of
parties in the lis before it and designed as the High Courts and this Court are
to investigate inter alia whether any fundamental rights are infringed and
vested with power to protect them, and quasi-judicial authorities which are
created under particular statutes and with a view to implement and administer
their provisions. I shall be content to leave the topic at this.”
13. In Mirajkar, a
nine Judge Bench judgment, a judicial order of High Court was challenged as
being violative of fundamental right. This Court by majority held that a judicial
order of a competent court could not violate a fundamental right. Even if there
was incidental violation, it could not be held to be violative of fundamental
right. Gajendragaddkar, CJ, observed :
“37. ……….The argument that the impugned order affects the fundamental
rights of the petitioners under Article 19(1), is based on a complete misconception
about the true nature and character of judicial process and of judicial
decisions. When a Judge deals with matters brought before him for his
adjudication, he first decides questions of fact on which the parties are at
issue, and then applies the relevant law to the said facts. Whether the findings
of fact recorded by the Judge are right or wrong, and whether the conclusion of
law drawn by him suffers from any infirmity, can be considered and decided if
the party aggrieved by the decision of the Judge takes the matter up before the
appellate court. But it is singularly inappropriate to assume that a judicial
decision pronounced by a Judge of competent jurisdiction in or in relation to a
matter brought before him for adjudication can affect the fundamental rights of
the citizens under Article 19(1). What the judicial decision purports to do is
to decide the controversy between the parties brought before the court and
nothing more. If this basic and essential aspect of the judicial process is borne
in mind, it would be plain that the judicial verdict pronounced by court in or
in relation to a matter brought before it for its decision cannot be said to
affect the fundamental rights of citizens under Article 19(1).
38. ………. Just as an order passed by the court
on the merits of the dispute before it can be challenged only in appeal and
cannot be said to contravene the fundamental rights of the litigants before the
Court, so could the impugned order be challenged in appeal under Article 136 of
the Constitution, but it cannot be said to affect the fundamental rights of the
petitioners. The character of the judicial order remains the same whether it is
passed in a matter directly in issue between the parties, or is passed
incidentally to make the adjudication of the dispute between the parties fair
and effective. On this view of the matter, it seems to us that the whole attack
against the impugned order based on the assumption that it infringes the
petitioners' fundamental rights under Article 19(1), must fail.
41. It is true that the opinion thus
expressed by Kania, C.J., in the case of A.K Gopalan [1950 SCR 88] had not
received the concurrence of the other learned Judges who heard the said case. Subsequently,
however, in Ram Singh v. State of Delhi [1951 SCR 451], the said observations were
cited with approval by the Full Court. The same principle has been accepted by
this Court in Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd., v. Union of India [1959 SCR
12], and by the majority judgment in Atiabari Tea Co., Ltd. v. State of Assam
[1961 (1) SCR 809.”
Explaining
observations in earlier judgments in Budhan Choudhary vs.state
of Bihar (AIR 1955 SC 191 = (1955) 1 SCR 1045) and Parbhani Tranport
Coop. Society Ltd. vs. Regional Transport Authority (AIR
(1960) SC 801 = (1960) 3 SCR 177) that a judicial order could be violative of
Article 14, it was observed :
“45. Naturally, the principal contention
which was urged on their behalf before this Court was that Section 30 CrPC,
infringed the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 14, and was, therefore,
invalid. This contention was repelled by this Court. Then, alternatively, the
appellants argued that though the section itself may not be discriminatory, it
may lend itself to abuse bringing about a discrimination between persons accused
of offences of the same kind, for the police may send up a person accused of an
offence under Section 366 to a Section 30 Magistrate and the police may send
another person accused of an offence under the same section to a Magistrate who
can commit the accused to the Court of Session This alternative contention was
examined and it was also rejected. That incidentally raised the question as to
whether the judicial decision could itself be said to offend Article 14. S.R.
Das, J., as he then was, who spoke for the Court considered this contention,
referred with approval to the observations made by Frankfurter, J., and Stone, C.J., of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Snowden v. Hughes [ (1944) 321 US1] and observed that the judicial
decision must of necessity depend on the facts and circumstances of each
particular case and what may superficially appear to be an unequal application
of the law may not necessarily amount to a denial of equal protection of law unless
there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional and purposeful discrimination.
Having made this observation which at best may be said to assume that a judicial
decision may conceivably contravene Article 14, the learned Judge took the
precaution of adding that the discretion of judicial officers is not arbitrary
and the law provides for revision by superior courts of orders passed by the subordinate
Courts. In such circumstances, there is hardly any ground for apprehending any capricious
discrimination by judicial tribunals.
46. It is thus clear that though the
observations made by Frankfurter, J. and Stone, C.J. in Snowden v. Hughes had
been cited with approval, the question as to whether a judicial order can
attract the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32(1) and (2) was not
argued and did not fall to be considered at all. That question became only
incidentally relevant in deciding whether the validity of the conviction which
was impugned by the appellants in the case of Budhan Choudhry could be
successfully assailed on the ground that the judicial decision under Section 30
CrPC, was capriciously rendered against the appellants. The scope of the jurisdiction
of this Court in exercising its writ jurisdiction in relation to orders passed
by the High Court was not and could not have been examined, because the matter
had come to this Court in appeal under Article 132(1); and whether or not
judicial decision can be said to affect any fundamental right merely because it
incidentally and indirectly may encroach upon such right, did not therefore
call for consideration or decision in that case. In fact, the closing
observations made in the judgment themselves indicate that this Court was of
the view that if any judicial order was sought to be attacked on the ground
that it was inconsistent with Article 14, the proper remedy to challenge such
an order would be an appeal or revision as may be provided by law. We are,
therefore, not prepared to accept Mr Setalvad's assumption that the
observations on which he bases himself support the proposition that according
to this Court, judicial decisions rendered by courts of competent jurisdiction
in or in relation to matters brought before them can be assailed on the ground
that they violate Article 14. It may incidentally be pointed out that the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Snowden v. Hughes was
itself not concerned with the validity of any judicial decision at all.
47. On the other hand, in Parbhani
Transport Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Regional Transport Authority, Aurangabad
Sarkar, J. speaking for the Court, has observed that the decision of the Regional
Transport Authority which was challenged before the Court may have been right
or wrong, but that they were unable to see how that decision could offend Article
14 or any other fundamental right of the petitioner. The learned Judge further
observed that the Regional Transport Authority was acting as a quasi-judicial
body and if it has made any mistake in its decision there are appropriate remedies
available to the petitioner for obtaining relief. It cannot complain of a
breach of Article 14. It is true that in this case also the larger issue as to
whether the orders passed by quasi judicial tribunals can be said to affect Article
14, does not appear to have been fully argued. It is clear that the
observations made by this Court in this case unambiguously indicate that it
would be inappropriate to suggest that the decision rendered by a judicial
tribunal can be described as offending Article 14 at all. It may be a right or
wrong decision, and if it is a wrong decision it can be corrected by appeal or revision
as may be permitted by law, but it cannot be said per se to contravene Article
14. It is significant that these observations have been made while dealing with
a writ petition filed by the petitioner, the Parbhani Transport Cooperative
Society Ltd. under Article 32; and insofar as the point has been considered and
decided the decision is against Mr Setalvad's contention.”
Decision of this Court in Prem
Chand Garg vs. Excise Commnr (AIR 1963 SC 996 = (1963)
Supp. 1 SCR 885), setting aside rule of this Court requiring deposit of
security for filing a writ petition, was also explained as not holding that a
judicial order resulted in violation of fundamental right :
“49. It would thus be seen that the main controversy in the
case of Prem Chand Garg centered round the question as to whether Article 145
conferred powers on this Court to make Rules, though they may be inconsistent
with the constitutional provisions prescribed by Part III Once it was held that
the powers under Article 142 had to be read subject not only to the fundamental
rights, but to other binding statutory provisions, it became clear that the
Rule which authorised the making of the impugned order was invalid. It was in
that context that the validity of the order had to be incidentally examined.
The petition was made not to challenge the order as such, but to challenge the
validity of the Rule under which the order was made. Once the Rule was struck
down as being invalid, the order passed under the said Rule had to be vacated.
It is difficult to see how this decision can be pressed into service by Mr
Setalvad in support of the argument that a judicial order passed by this Court
was held to be subject to the writ jurisdiction of this Court itself. What was
held by this Court was that Rule made by it under its powers conferred by
Article 145 which are legislative in character, was invalid; but that is quite
another matter.
50. It is plain that if a party desires to challenge any of
the Rules framed by this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 145 on
the ground that they are invalid, because they illegally contravene his
fundamental rights, it would be open to the party to move this Court under
Article 32. Such a challenge is not against any decision of this Court, but
against a Rule made by it in pursuance of its rule-making power. If the Rule is
struck down as it was in the case of Prem Chand Garg, this Court can review or
recall its order passed under the said Rule. Cases in which initial orders of
security passed by the Court are later reviewed and the amount of security
initially directed is reduced, frequently arise in this Court; but they show
the exercise of this Court's powers under Article 137 and not under Article 32.
Therefore, we are not satisfied that Mr Setalvad is fortified by any judicial
decision of this Court in raising the contention that a judicial order passed
by the High Court in or in relation to proceedings brought before it for its
adjudication, can become the subject-matter of writ jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 32(2). In fact, no precedent has been cited before us which would
support Mr Setalvad's claim that a judicial order of the kind with which we are
concerned in the present proceedings has ever been attempted to be challenged
or has been set aside under Article 32 of the Constitution.”
This Court then
dealt with the legal position in England on the question of scope of writ of
certiorari against a judicial order. Noting that writ of certiorari did not lie
against a judicial order, it was observed :
“62. Whilst we are dealing with this aspect of the matter, we
may incidentally refer to the relevant observations made by Halsbury on this point.
“In the case of judgments of inferior courts of civil jurisdiction,” says
Halsbury in the footnote, “it has been suggested that certiorari might be
granted to quash them for want of jurisdiction [Kemp v. Balne (1844), 1 Dow.
& L. 885, at p. 887], inasmuch as an error did not lie upon that ground. But there appears to be no reported
case in which the judgment of an inferior court of civil jurisdiction has been quashed
on certiorari, either for want of jurisdiction or on any other ground [Halsbury
Laws of England Vol.I 1, p.129]”. The ultimate proposition is set out in the terms:
“Certiorari does not lie to quash the judgments of inferior courts of civil jurisdiction.”
These observations would indicate that in England the judicial orders passed by
civil courts of plenary jurisdiction in or in relation to matters brought
before them are not held to be amenable to the jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari.
63. In Rex. v. Chancellor of St. Edmundsburry and Ipswich
Diocese Ex parte White [(1945) 1 KBD 195] the question which arose was whether certiorari
would lie from the Court of King's Bench to an ecclesiastical Court; and the
answer rendered by the court was that certiorari would not lie against the
decision of an ecclesiastical court. In dealing with this question, Wrottesley,
L.J. has elaborately considered the history of the writ jurisdiction and has
dealt with the question about the meaning of the word ‘inferior' as applied to
courts of law in England in discussing the problem as to the issue of the writ
in regard to decisions of certain courts. “The more this matter was
investigated,” says Wrottesley, L.J., “the clearer it became that the word
“inferior” as applied to courts of law in England had been used with at least
two very different meanings. If, as some assert, the question of inferiority is
determined by ascertaining whether the court in question can be stopped from
exceeding its jurisdiction by a writ of prohibition issuing from the King's
Bench, then not only the ecclesiastical courts, but also palatine courts and
admiralty courts are inferior courts. But there is another test, well
recognised by lawyers, by which to distinguish a superior from an inferior
court, namely, whether in its proceedings, and in particular in its judgments,
it must appear that the court was acting within its jurisdiction. This is the
characteristic of an inferior court, whereas in the proceedings of a superior
court it will be presumed that it acted within its jurisdiction unless the
contrary should appear either on the face of the proceedings or aliunde.” Mr
Sen relied upon this decision to show that even the High Court of Bombay can be
said to be an inferior court for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction by this
Court under Article 32(2) to issue a writ of certiorari in respect of the impugned
order passed by it. We are unable to see how this decision can support Mr Sen's
contentions.” (emphasis added).
14. In Rupa Ashok Hurra (supra) it
was held that final order of this Court cannot be challenged under Article 32
as violative of fundamental right. Judgment of this Court in Triveniben vs.
State of Gujarat [(1989) 1 SCC 678] was referred to with approval
to the effect that a judicial order could not violate a fundamental right. It
was observed :
“11. In Triveniben v. State of Gujarat speaking for himself and other three
learned Judges of the Constitution Bench, Oza, J., reiterating the same principle,
observed: (SCC p. 697, para 22)
“It is well settled now that a judgment of court can
never be challenged under Articles 14 or 21 and therefore the judgment of the
court awarding the sentence of death is not open to challenge as violating
Article 14 or Article 21 as has been laid down by this Court in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State
of Maharashtra and also in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [1988 (2) SCC 602], the only jurisdiction which could be
sought to be exercised by a prisoner for infringement of his rights can be to challenge
the subsequent events after the final judicial verdict is pronounced and it is
because of this that on the ground of long or inordinate delay a condemned
prisoner could approach this Court and that is what has consistently been held
by this Court. But it will not be open to this Court in exercise of
jurisdiction under Article 32 to go behind or to examine the final verdict
reached by a competent court convicting and sentencing the condemned prisoner
and even while considering the circumstances in order to reach a conclusion as
to whether the inordinate delay coupled with subsequent circumstances could be
held to be sufficient for coming to a conclusion that execution of the sentence
of death will not be just and proper.”
12. We consider it inappropriate to burden this judgment with
discussion of the decisions in other cases taking the same view. Suffice it to
mention that various Benches of this Court reiterated the same principle in the
following cases: A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, Krishna Swami v. Union of India [1992 (4) SCC 605], Mohd. Aslam v. Union of India [1996 (2) SCC 749], Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v.
Registrar General, Supreme Court of India [1996 (3) SCC 114], Gurbachan Singh v. Union of India [1996 (3) SCC 117], Babu Singh Bains v. Union of India
[1996 (6) SCC
565] and P. Ashokan v.
Union of India [1998 (3) SCC 56.
13. It is, however, true that in Supreme Court Bar Assn. v.
Union of India [1998 (4) SCC 409 a Constitution Bench and in M.S. Ahlawat v. State of Haryana [2000 (1) SCC 278] a three-Judge Bench,
and in other cases different Benches quashed the earlier judgments/orders of
this Court in an application filed under Article 32 of the Constitution. But in
those cases no one joined issue with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition
under Article 32 of the Constitution. Therefore, those cases cannot be read as authority
for the proposition that a writ of certiorari under Article 32 would lie to
challenge an earlier final judgment of this Court.
14. On the analysis of the ratio laid down in the aforementioned
cases, we reaffirm our considered view that a final judgment/order passed by
this Court cannot be assailed in an application under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India by an aggrieved person, whether he was a party to the case
or not.
15. In fairness to the learned counsel for the parties, we
record that all of them at the close of the hearing of these cases conceded
that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution cannot
be invoked to challenge the validity of a final judgment/order passed by this Court
after exhausting the remedy of review under Article 137 of the Constitution
read with Order XL Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966.”
15.
While the above
judgments dealt with the question whether judicial order could violate a
fundamental right, it was clearly laid down that challenge to judicial orders
could lie by way of appeal or revision or under Article 227 and not by way of a
writ under Article 226 and 32.
16. Another Bench of three judges in Sadhana
Lodh vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. (2003 (3) SCC 524) considered the question whether remedy of writ
will be available when remedy of appeal
was on limited grounds. This Court held :
“6. The right of appeal is a statutory right and where the
law provides remedy by filing an appeal on limited grounds, the grounds of challenge
cannot be enlarged by filing a petition under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution on the premise that the insurer has limited grounds available for
challenging the award given by the Tribunal. Section 149(2) of the Act limits
the insurer to file an appeal on those enumerated grounds and the appeal being
a product of the statute it is not open to an insurer to take any plea other
than those provided under Section 149(2) of the Act (see National Insurance Co.
Ltd. v. Nicolletta Rohtagi (2002 (7) SCC 456). This being the legal position,
the petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution by the insurer was wholly misconceived. Where a statutory right
to file an appeal has been provided for, it is not open to the High Court to
entertain a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. Even if where a remedy
by way of an appeal has not been provided for against the order and judgment of
a District Judge, the remedy available to the aggrieved person is to file a
revision before the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Where remedy
for filing a revision before the High Court under Section 115 CPC has been
expressly barred by a State enactment, only in such case a petition under
Article 227 of the Constitution would lie and not under Article 226 of the Constitution.
As a matter of illustration, where a trial court in a civil suit refused to grant
temporary injunction and an appeal against refusal to grant injunction has been
rejected, and a State enactment has barred the remedy of filing revision under
Section 115 CPC, in such a situation a writ petition under Article 227 would
lie and not under Article 226 of the Constitution. Thus, where the State
Legislature has barred a remedy of filing a revision petition before the High Court
under Section 115 CPC, no petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would lie
for the reason that a mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough
to attract jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution.” (emphasis added)
17.
This Court in
judgment dated 6 December, 1989 in Civil Appeal No.815 of 1989 Qamruddin vs.
Rasul Baksh& Anr. which has been quoted in Allahabad High Court Judgment in Ganga Saran vs. Civil
Judge (AIR 1991 All 114) considered the issue of writ of certiorari and
mandamus against interim order of civil court and held :
“If the order of injunction is passed by a competent
court having jurisdiction in the matter, it is not permissible for the High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the same by issuing a writ
of certiorari. In the instant case the learned Single Judge of the High Court
further failed to realise that a writ of mandamus could not be issued in this
case. A writ of mandamus cannot be issued to a private individual unless he is
under a statutory duty to perform a public duty. The dispute involved in the
instant case was entirely between two private parties, which could not be a subject
matter of writ of mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned
Single Judge ignored this basic principle of writ jurisdiction conferred on the
High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. There was no occasion or justification
for issue of a writ of certiorari or mandamus. The High Court committed serious
error of jurisdiction in interfering with the order of the District Judge.”
18.
Thus, it has
been clearly laid down by this Court that
an Order of civil court could be challenged under Article 227 and not
under Article 226.
19. We may now come to
the judgment in Surya Dev Rai. Therein, the appellant was
aggrieved by denial of interim
injunction in a pending suit and preferred a writ petition in the High court
stating that after CPC amendment by Act 46 of 1999 w.e.f. 1 July, 2002, remedy
of revision under Section 115 was no longer available. The High Court dismissed
the petition following its Full Bench Judgment in Ganga Saran to
the effect that a writ was not maintainable as no mandamus could issue to a
private person. The Bench considered the question of the impact of CPC amendment
on power and jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a writ of certiorari
under Article 226 or a petition under Article 227 to involve power of
superintendence. The Bench noted the
legal position that after CPC amendment revisional jurisdiction of the High
Court against interlocutory order was curtailed. The Bench then referred to the
history of writ of certiorari and its scope and concluded thus :
“18. Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar case was cited before the
Constitution Bench in Rupa Ashok Hurra case and considered. It has been clearly
held: (i) that it is a well-settled principle that the technicalities
associated with the prerogative writs in English law have no role to play under
our constitutional scheme; (ii) that a writ of certiorari to call for records
and examine the same for passing appropriate orders, is issued by a superior
court to an inferior court which certifies its records for examination; and
(iii) that a High Court cannot issue a writ to another High Court, nor can one
Bench of a High Court issue a writ to a different Bench of the High Court; much
less can the writ jurisdiction of a High Court be invoked to seek issuance of a
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. The High Courts are not constituted as
inferior courts in our constitutional scheme.
19. Thus, there is no manner of doubt that the orders and
proceedings of a judicial court subordinate to the High Court are amenable to writ
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
xxxx
24. The difference between Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution was well brought out in Umaji Keshao Meshram v. Radhikabai [1986 Supp.
SCC 401]. Proceedings under Article 226 are in exercise of the original
jurisdiction of the High Court while proceedings under Article 227 of the
Constitution are not original but only supervisory. Article 227 substantially
reproduces the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915
excepting that the power of superintendence has been extended by this article
to tribunals as well. Though the power is akin to that of an ordinary court of
appeal, yet the power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and
only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and
tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere
errors. The power may be exercised in cases occasioning grave injustice or
failure of justice such as when (i) the court or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction
which it does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it
does have, such failure occasioning a failure of justice, and (iii) the
jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner which tantamounts
to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction.
25. Upon a review of decided cases and a survey of the
occasions, wherein the High Courts have exercised jurisdiction to command a
writ of certiorari or to exercise supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 in
the given facts and circumstances in a variety of cases, it seems that the
distinction between the two jurisdictions stands almost obliterated in
practice. Probably, this is the reason why it has become customary with the
lawyers labelling their petitions as one common under Articles 226 and 227 of
the Constitution, though such practice has been deprecated in some judicial
pronouncement. Without entering into niceties and technicality of the subject,
we venture to state the broad general difference between the two jurisdictions.
Firstly, the writ of certiorari is an exercise of its original jurisdiction by
the High Court; exercise of supervisory jurisdiction is not an original jurisdiction
and in this sense it is akin to appellate, revisional or corrective
jurisdiction. Secondly, in a writ of certiorari, the record of the proceedings
having been certified and sent up by the inferior court or tribunal to the High
Court, the High Court if inclined to exercise its jurisdiction, may simply
annul or quash the proceedings and then do no more. In exercise of supervisory
jurisdiction, the High Court may not only quash or set aside the impugned proceedings,
judgment or order but it may also make such directions as the facts and circumstances
of the case may warrant, maybe, by way of guiding the inferior court or
tribunal as to the manner in which it would now proceed further or afresh as
commended to or guided by the High Court. In appropriate cases the High Court,
while exercising supervisory jurisdiction, may substitute such a decision of
its own in place of the impugned decision, as the inferior court or tribunal
should have made. Lastly, the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution is capable of being exercised on a prayer made by or on behalf of
the party aggrieved; the supervisory jurisdiction is capable of being exercised
suo motu as well.
20.
It is the above holding, correctness of which
was doubted in the referring order already mentioned above.
21.
It is true that this Court has laid down that technicalities
associated with the prerogative writs in England have no role to play under our
constitutional scheme. There is no parallel system of King’s Court in India and
of all other courts having limited jurisdiction subject to supervision of
King’s Court. Courts are set up under the Constitution or the laws. All courts
in the jurisdiction of a High Court are subordinate to it and subject to its
control and supervision under Article 227. Writ jurisdiction is constitutionally
conferred on all High Courts. Broad principles of writ jurisdiction followed in
England are applicable to India and a writ of certiorari lies against patently
erroneous or without jurisdiction orders of Tribunals or authorities or courts
other than judicial courts. There are no precedents in India for High Courts to
issue writs to subordinate courts. Control of working of subordinate courts in
dealing with their judicial orders is exercised by way of appellate or
revisional powers or power of superintendence
under Article 227. Orders of civil court stand on different footing from the
orders of authorities or Tribunals or courts other than judicial/civil courts.
While appellate or revisional jurisdiction is regulated by statutes, power of
superintendence under Article 227 is constitutional. The expression “inferior
court” is not referable to judicial courts, as rightly observed in the referring
order in paras 26 and 27 quoted above.
22. The Bench in Surya Dev
Rai also observed in para 25 of its judgment that distinction between
Articles 226 and 227stood almost obliterated. In para 24 of the said judgment
distinction in the two articles has been noted. In view thereof, observation
that scope of Article 226 and 227 was obliterated was not correct as rightly observed
by the referring Bench in Para 32 quoted above. We make it clear that though
despite the curtailment of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC by Act
46 of 1999, jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 remains
unaffected, it has been wrongly assumed in certain quarters that the said jurisdiction
has been expanded. Scope of Article 227 has been explained in several decisions
including Waryam Singh and another vs. Amarnath and another
(AIR 1954 SC 215=1954 SCR 565), Ouseph Mathai vs. M. Abdul Khadir
(2002 (1) SCC 319) , Shalini Shyam Shetty vs. Rajendra
Shankar Patil (2010 (8) SCC 329) and Sameer Suresh Gupta vs. Rahul Kumar Agarwal
(2013 (9) SCC 374). In Shalini Shyam Shetty, this Court
observed :
“64. However, this Court unfortunately discerns that of late
there is a growing trend amongst several High Courts to entertain writ petition
in cases of pure property disputes. Disputes relating to partition suits,
matters relating to execution of a decree, in cases of dispute between landlord
and tenant and also in a case of money decree and in various other cases where
disputed questions of property are involved, writ courts are entertaining such disputes.
In some cases the High Courts, in a routine manner, entertain petitions under
Article 227 over such disputes and such petitions are treated as writ
petitions.
65. We would like to make it clear that in view of the law
referred to above in cases of property rights and in disputes between private individuals
writ court should not interfere unless there is any infraction of statute or it
can be shown that a private individual is acting in collusion with a statutory
authority.
66. We may also observe that in some High Courts there is a
tendency of entertaining petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution by terming
them as writ petitions. This is sought to be justified on an erroneous
appreciation of the ratio in Surya Dev and in view of the recent amendment to
Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment)
Act, 1999. It is urged that as a result of the amendment, scope of Section 115 CPC
has been curtailed. In our view, even if the scope of Section 115 CPC is curtailed that has not
resulted in expanding the High Court’s power of superintendence. It is too well known to be reiterated
that in exercising its jurisdiction, High Court must follow the regime of law.
67. As a result of frequent interference by the Hon’ble High
Court either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution with pending civil
and at times criminal cases, the disposal of cases by the civil and criminal
courts gets further impeded and thus causing serious problems in the
administration of justice. This Court hopes and trusts that in exercising its
power either under Article 226 or 227, the Hon’ble High Court will follow the
time honoured principles discussed above. Those principles have been formulated
by this Court for ends of justice and the High Courts as the highest courts of
justice within their jurisdiction will adhere to them strictly.” (emphasis added)
23.
Thus, we are of the
view that judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to a writ of
certiorari under Article 226. We are also in agreement with the view of the referring
Bench that a writ of mandamus does not lie against a private person not
discharging any public duty. Scope of Article 227 is different from Article
226.
24.
We may also deal with the submission
made on behalf of the respondent that
the view in Surya Dev Rai stands approved by larger Benches in Shail,
Mahendra Saree Emporium and Salem Advocate Bar Assn and on that ground
correctness of the said view cannot be gone into by this Bench. In Shail,
though reference has been made to Surya Dev Rai, the same is only
for the purpose of scope of power under Article 227 as is clear from para 3 of
the said judgment. There is no discussion on the issue of maintainability of a
petition under Article 226. In Mahendra Saree Emporium, reference
to Surya Dev Rai is made in para 9 of the judgment only for the
proposition that no subordinate legislation can whittle down the jurisdiction
conferred by the Constitution. Similarly, in Salem Bar Assn. in
para 40, reference to Surya Dev Rai is for the same purpose. We
are, thus, unable to accept the submission of learned counsel for the
respondent.
25. Accordingly, we answer the question
referred as follows :
“(i) Judicial orders of civil court are not amenable to
writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution;
(ii) Jurisdiction under Article 227 is distinct from
jurisdiction from jurisdiction under Article 226. Contrary view in Surya Dev Rai is overruled.”
26.
The
matters may now be listed before the appropriate Bench for further orders.
.…..…………………………….CJI.
[H.L. DATTU]
..……..…………………………….J.
[A.K. SIKRI]
.…...………………………………..J.
[ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ]
NEW DELHI
FEBRUARY 26, 2015
