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Friday, January 31, 2014

Acquisition of Land – Whether can be made by State ignoring report of Land Acquisition Collector ? Held Void by Apex Court



Head Notes:
  1. Section 6(1) provides that if the appropriate Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made by the Collector under Section 5- A(2) that particular land is needed for the specified public purpose then a declaration should be made. This necessarily implies that the State Government is required to apply mind to the report of the Collector and take final decision on the objections filed by the landowners and other interested persons. Then and then only, a declaration can be made under Section 6(1).

  1.  It must be borne in mind that the proceedings under the LA Act are based on the principle of eminent domain and Section 5-A is the only protection available to a person whose lands are sought to be acquired. It is a minimal safeguard afforded to him by law to protect himself from arbitrary acquisition by pointing out to the authority concerned, inter alia, that the important ingredient, namely, "public purpose" is absent in the proposed acquisition or the acquisition is mala fide. The LA Act being an expropriatory legislation, its provisions will have to be strictly construed.



IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 973-974 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NOS. 14383-14384 OF 2012)

VINOD KUMAR                                                                       ……… APPELLANT
Vs.
STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS.                                       ……… RESPONDENTS


J U D G M E N T: V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.

1.    Delay condoned. Leave granted.

2.     These appeals are filed by the appellant questioning the correctness of the judgment and final Order dated 05.04.2011 passed in C.W.P. No. 7746 of 2009 and order dated 16.12.2011 passed in Review Application No. 388 of 2011 by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, urging various facts and legal contentions in justification of his claim.

3.     Necessary relevant facts are stated hereunder to appreciate the case of the appellant and also to find out whether the appellant is entitled for the relief as prayed in this appeal.

            The appellant is the owner of 5 Kanals 6 Marlas of land out of which 934 square yards have been left out of acquisition. On 07.02.2008, under the Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977, the Haryana Urban Development Authority issued a notice for acquisition of land including that of the appellant for public purpose namely, for the development and utilization of the land as residential and commercial purposes. The notification was issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short ‘the Act’) and the Land Acquisition Collector, Urban Estate, Faridabad, Haryana was authorized to issue public notice on the substance of notification at convenient places in the locality. He was also authorized to survey upon the land and take necessary action regarding the same. The appellant filed a detailed objection under Section 5A of the Act categorically stating that the appellant has raised an A Class construction on the concerned area in the year 1999-2000 and therefore, inclusion of the land for the purpose of acquisition is not justified. In the meanwhile, on 10.03.2008, the said land was released by the Authority in favour of Ritwiz Builders and Developers Pvt. Ltd. However, on 15.09.2008, the Land Acquisition Collector considered the objection filed by the appellant under Section 5A of the Act and as per his report, exempted the land of the appellant from acquisition since there was already a residential building on the land on the date of the notification. In spite of the report produced by the Land Acquisition Collector, the Haryana Urban Development Authority vide notification dated 06.02.2009 made a declaration that the appellant’s land is to be acquired for the development of residential and commercial Sector Nos. 76,77 and 78 for which the notification was initially issued on 07.02.2008.

4.     It is the case of the appellant that while issuing the notification under Section 6 of the Act, the property adjoining to the land of the appellant, which belongs to one M/s. Harpreet Food, was released. Though the respondent Authority has released a portion of the appellant’s property, some part of the built-up and constructed portion of the house was not released.

5.     The appellant therefore, filed a writ petition before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana registered as Writ Petition No. 7746 of 2009, challenging the acquisition of his land by the Authority. The said petition got tagged along with other similar petitions filed by different affected parties and the Writ Petition No. 7711 of 2009, titled New Vidya Niketan Educational Society Vs. State of Haryana & Ors. was made the lead case.

6.     The High Court, after hearing both the parties concluded that in all the writ petitions, construction was raised in an unauthorized manner without getting any permission either under the provisions of the Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas Restriction of Unregulated Development Act, 1963 or under the relevant Municipal laws. Even then in some cases, relief was granted by releasing some portion of the land under construction and ordering acquisition of vacant land. The action taken by the Authority was held perfectly justified. The Review Application No. 388 of 2011 filed by the appellant against dismissal of his C.W.P. No. 7746 of 2009 was also dismissed on 16.12.2011. Hence, these appeals.

7.     The learned senior counsel Mr. Pallav Sisodia, appearing on behalf of the appellant argued that the High Court failed to appreciate that there was a construction already made by the appellant for residential purpose. Therefore, as per the policy of the Government of Haryana, the constructed portion including the amenities and other built up areas are required to be released from the process of acquisition. It is the further case of the appellant that the High Court erred in not appreciating the fact that the Land Acquisition Collector in his report has mentioned that the land of the appellant may not be acquired since it has a well–laiden beautiful residence. The State Government, as per the learned senior counsel, illegally and in an unauthorized manner, has acquired the land. It is also the case of the appellant that in a different case having similar facts, the High Court has passed an Order releasing the lands over which built up houses were situated. The learned senior counsel of the appellant further argues that the Government has adopted the ‘pick and choose’ methodology for acquiring land thereby exempting the commercial establishments from acquisition and discriminating against the appellant.
8.     The learned Additional Advocate General Mr. Manjit Singh, appearing on behalf of the State contended that the appellant had illegally raised construction on this land without permission of the concerned authority. Hence, the appellant cannot now seek exemption from acquisition on the ground that there is a residential construction on the land and therefore, the land cannot be acquired.

9.     We are inclined to observe that the High Court has erred in dismissing the writ petition of the appellant as the same is contrary to the principle laid down by this Court in the following cases :-

          In Kamal Trading (P) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal (2012) 2 SCC 25, it has been held as under:-

   “14. It must be borne in mind that the proceedings under the LA Act are based on the principle of eminent domain and Section 5-A is the only protection available to a person whose lands are sought to be acquired. It is a minimal safeguard afforded to him by law to protect himself from arbitrary acquisition by pointing out to the authority concerned, inter alia, that the important ingredient, namely, "public purpose" is absent in the proposed acquisition or the acquisition is mala fide. The LA Act being an expropriatory legislation, its provisions will have to be strictly construed.

   15. Hearing contemplated under Section 5-A(2) is necessary to enable the Collector to deal effectively with the objections raised against the proposed acquisition and make a report. The report of the Collector referred to in this provision is not an empty formality because it is required to be placed before the appropriate Government together with the Collector's recommendations and the record of the case. It is only upon receipt of the said report that the Government can take a final decision on the objections. It is pertinent to note that declaration under Section 6 has to be made only after the appropriate Government is satisfied on the consideration of the report, if any, made by the Collector under Section 5-A(2). As said by this Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., the appropriate Government while issuing declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act is required to apply its mind not only to the objections filed by the owner of the land in question, but also to the report which is submitted by the Collector upon making such further inquiry thereon as he thinks necessary and also the recommendations made by him in that behalf.

   16. Sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the LA Act makes a declaration under Section 6 conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose. Formation of opinion by the appropriate Government as regards the public purpose must be preceded by application of mind as regards consideration of relevant factors and rejection of irrelevant ones. It is, therefore, that the hearing contemplated under Section 5-A and the report made by the Land Acquisition Officer and his recommendations assume importance. It is implicit in this provision that before making declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act, the State Government must have the benefit of a report containing recommendations of the Collector submitted under Section 5A(2) of the LA Act. The recommendations must indicate objective application of mind.”
(Emphasis laid by this Court)

        In the case of Usha Stud and Agricultural Farms Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana (2013) 4 SCC 210, it was held as under:

   “30…..Section 6(1) provides that if the appropriate Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made by the Collector under Section 5- A(2) that particular land is needed for the specified public purpose then a declaration should be made. This necessarily implies that the State Government is required to apply mind to the report of the Collector and take final decision on the objections filed by the landowners and other interested persons. Then and then only, a declaration can be made under Section 6(1).”
(Emphasis laid by this Court)

     Further, in the case of Women’s Education Trust and Anr. v. State of Haryana & Ors.3, this Court has held as under:-

   20. What is most surprising is that the High Court did not even deal with the issue relating to application of mind by the Government to the report submitted by the Land Acquisition Collector under Section 5A(2) along with his recommendations. The documents produced before the High Court and this Court do not show that the State Government had objectively applied mind to the recommendations made by the Land Acquisition Collector and felt satisfied that the land in question deserves to be acquired for the purpose specified in the notification issued under Section 4(1). The record also does not contain any indication as to why the State Government did not consider it proper to accept the recommendations of the Land Acquisition Collector. Therefore, there is no escape from the conclusion that the impugned acquisition is ultra vires the provisions contained in Section 6 of the Act.”
(Emphasis laid by this Court)

         Also, in an earlier case in Shyam Nandan Prasad & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. (1993) 4 SCC 255  this Court observed that compliance of Section 5A of the Act is a sine qua non for acquisition of land. This Court held that:

   “10.…..The decision of the Collector is supposedly final unless the appropriate Government chooses to interfere therein and cause affectation, suo motu or on the application of any person interested in the land. These requirements obviously lead to the positive conclusion that the proceeding before the Collector is a blend of public and individual enquiry. The person interested, or known to be interested, in the land is to be served personally of the notification, giving him the opportunity of objecting to the acquisition and awakening him to such right. That the objection is to be in writing, is indicative of the fact that the enquiry into the objection is to focus his individual cause as well as public cause…..”

10.  In the light of the foregoing cases, it is evident that the government has to consider the report of the Land Acquisition Collector while making declaration of acquisition of land under Section 6 of the Act. Further, if the government is coming to a conclusion which is contrary to the report, then the government has to provide appropriate reason for the same. The report of Land Acquisition Collector is extracted hereunder:-

“REPORT U/S 5-A OF SECTOR 76, 77, 78 FARIDABAD-U/S 4 DATED 7.2.2008


S.
No
.
of
Ob
j.

Name of
Place and
Sector

Name
of the
Object
or

Khasra
No.
total
land

Total
constructed
area

Type of
Construction

Whether
Constructi
on
before or
after u/s
4

Objec
tion
of
the
Petit
ioner

Recomme
ndatio
n
of L.A.O.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
4
Farid-pur
76,77, 78








5
-do-
Vinod
son of
Birbal
18/13/3
(4-10)
8/2/3
(1-16)/
6-6

1200
Sq.yds.
Residentia
l Kothi
swimming
Pool
Boundary
Wall

A-Class
Prior
The
applicant
has reque
sted to get his house
released
from
acqui
sition

A well
laiden
beautiful
residence
. Hence,
may not
be
acquired.



Sd/-L.A.C.
15.09.2008”


11. Hence, the declaration made by the Government for  acquisition of land of the appellant under Section 6 of the Act does not provide any reason for arriving at a decision contrary to that of the report produced by the Land Acquisition Collector. Therefore, the basic protection to which the landowners are entitled to under the Act through Section 5A is violated. Consequently, the process of acquisition of the land of the appellant is tainted with mala-fide and therefore, the same is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the impugned acquisition notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act in relation to the appellant’s land and the action taken thereon are hereby quashed. The impugned judgment and orders of the High Court are set aside. The appeals are allowed. No costs.


………………………………………………………………………J.
[SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA]
………………………………………………………………………J.
[V. GOPALA GOWDA]
New Delhi,
January 28, 2014

Thursday, January 23, 2014

In-ordinate delay : When an aggrieved person can apply before the Court, if no limitation is prescribed in the statute for filing an appeal before the appropriate forum ?

Held:
Now, the sole question which falls for our consideration is : when an aggrieved person can apply before the Court, if no limitation is prescribed in the statute for filing an appeal before the appropriate forum. We have duly considered the said question. Even if we assume that no limitation is prescribed in any statute to file an application before the court in that case, can an aggrieved person come before the court at his sweet will at any point of time ? The answer must be in the negative. If no time-limit has been prescribed in a statute to apply before the appropriate forum, in that case, he has to come before the court within a reasonable time. This Court on a number of occasions, while dealing with the matter of similar nature held that where even no limitation has been prescribed, the petition must be filed within a reasonable time. In our considered opinion, the period of 9 years and 11 months, is nothing but an inordinate delay to pursue the remedy of a person and without submitting any cogent reason there for. The court has no power to condone the same in such case.
(Para 7)



Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7921 OF 2013
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition [C] No.2991/2011)

Londhe Prakash Bhagwan                                      … Appellant
Vs.
Dattatraya Eknath Mane & Ors.                            … Respondents

J U D G M E N T: PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.

1.   Leave granted.

2.    This appeal is directed against the order dated July 1, 2010 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay whereby the High Court remanded the matter to the School Tribunal directing it to register the appeal and hear the same in accordance with law. The High Court felt that if an appeal is preferred against an order of supersession before the School Tribunal under Section 9(1)(b) of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools  (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the MEPS Act’), the provisions of limitation do not apply to such appeals and accordingly remanded the matter before the School Tribunal.

3.   The appellant being aggrieved by the said order has preferred this appeal.

4.    The facts of the case are as follows :

4.1  On August 16, 1996 the appellant was appointed as the Headmaster of Shri Chatrapati Shivaji Vidhyalaya run by Jijamata Shikshan Prasarak Mandal. Then respondent No.1 was acting as the in-charge Headmaster of the said School. The appointment of the appellant was approved in a meeting held on August 14, 1996 and the respondent No.1 presided over the said meeting. On August 21,1996 such appointment of the appellant was duly approved by the Education Officer, after following due procedure. It appears from the facts that on July 11, 2007, respondent No.1, after a delay of 9 years and 11 months, filed an application for condonation of delay before the School Tribunal (being Misc. Appeal No. 78/2006) challenging the appointment of the appellant. By an order dated 14th March, 2007, the said application was dismissed by the School Tribunal. It is recorded in the said order that respondent No.1 claiming himself to be the senior most teacher in the School, having been appointed as an Assistant Teacher in the year 1991 and the Management has denied his claim to the said post of Headmaster.

4.2. The School Tribunal, after hearing the parties, found that respondent No.1 herein on August 9, 1995 voluntarily resigned from the post of the In-charge Headmaster of the said School. Such resignation was duly accepted by the Management. It also noticed that the Management thereafter applied before the Deputy Director of Education and sought permission to appoint a Headmaster after publication of an advertisement in accordance with the MEPS Rules. Such permission was granted to the Management. After following the due procedure, the post of Headmaster was filled up by the Management on August 14, 1996.

4.3. The School Tribunal duly considered the matter on merits and noticed that respondent No.1 himself presided over the meeting of the Managing Committee and approved the appointment of the present appellant as Headmaster of the said School. Admittedly, the appellant was working since then and the said fact was known to the respondent No.1. Admittedly, he did not apply before the appropriate authority for appropriate remedy, save and except he filed representations addressed to R/M. In these circumstances, the School Tribunal refused to condone the delay and dismissed the application.

5.    Being aggrieved, a writ petition was filed by respondent No.1 before the High Court and the High Court remanded the matter to the School Tribunal, holding that the provisions of limitation do not apply to appeals filed under Section 9(1)(b) of the said Act. It is to be noted that respondent No. 1 filed writ petition before the High Court and on August 2, 2007, the High Court was pleased to dismiss the same, observing that the Presiding Officer was right in rejecting the application for condonation of delay of about 10 years in preferring the application. Subsequently, it further appears that in 2009, respondent No.1 filed a review petition before the High Court when the High Court was pleased to recall the order dated August 2, 2007 and restored the same on the file and thereafter on July 1, 2010, it allowed the writ petition.

6.    In these circumstances, the only question that arises is, whether an application can be filed by an aggrieved party even long after 10 years. It is necessary for us to quote Section 9 of the said Act for our consideration, which is set out hereunder :

9. Right of appeal to Tribunal to employees of a private school.

§  (1)Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract for the time being in force, [any employee in a private school,-

§  (a)Who is dismissed or removed or whose services are otherwise terminated or who is reduced in rank, by the order passed by the Management; or

§  (b)Who is superseded by the Management while making an appointment to any post by promotion, and who is aggrieved, shall have a right to appeal and may appeal against any such order or supersession to the Tribunal constituted under section 8:]

§        Provided that, no such appeal shall lie to the Tribunal in any case where the matter has already been decided by a Court of competent jurisdiction or is pending before such Court, on the appointed date or where the order of dismissal, removal, otherwise termination of service or reduction in rank was passed by the Management at any time before the 1st July, 1976.

§  (2) Such appeal shall be made by the employee to the Tribunal, within thirty days from the date of receipt by him of the order of dismissal, removal otherwise termination of service or reduction in rank, as the case may be.

§            Provided that, where such order was made before the appointed date, such appeal may be made within sixty days from the said date.

§  (3)Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), the Tribunal may entertain an appeal made to it after the expiry of the said period of thirty or sixty days, as the case may be, if it is satisfied that the appellant has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within that period.

§  (4)Every appeal shall be accompanied by a fee of [Five hundred] rupees, which shall not be refunded and shall be credited to the Consolidated Fund of the State.

7.    We have noticed from the language of the said Section that the right of appeal is given to an employee of a private school who is aggrieved by an order of the Management in respect of dismissal, removal, termination, reduction in rank or supersession. In all these cases, the aggrieved person shall have a right to approach the Tribunal. Now, the sole question which falls for our consideration is : when an aggrieved person can apply before the Court, if no limitation is prescribed in the statute for filing an appeal before the appropriate forum. We have duly considered the said question. Even if we assume that no limitation is prescribed in any statute to file an application before the court in that case, can an aggrieved person come before the court at his sweet will at any point of time ? The answer must be in the negative. If no time-limit has been prescribed in a statute to apply before the appropriate forum, in that case, he has to come before the court within a reasonable time. This Court on a number of occasions, while dealing with the matter of similar nature held that where even no limitation has been prescribed, the petition must be filed within a reasonable time. In our considered opinion, the period of 9 years and 11 months, is nothing but an inordinate delay to pursue the remedy of a person and without submitting any cogent reason there for. The court has no power to condone the same in such case. (See: Cicily Kallarackal v. Vehicle Factory [2012 (8) SCC 524], State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty [2011 (3) SCC 436] and K.R. Mudgal v. R.P. Singh [1986 (4) SCC 531]. In these cases, it has been held that the application should be rejected on the ground of inordinate delay. Furthermore, it is to be noted that appointment of the appellant was within the knowledge of respondent No.1 from day one but he did not take any steps for such a long time.

8.    In these circumstances, we find it is difficult for us to uphold the decision of the High Court. We are sure that the said question of inordinate delay missed out from the mind of the court at the time of sending back the matter before the Tribunal. Accordingly, we set aside the order passed by the High Court, allow the appeal and affirm the order of the Tribunal.


..……………………J.
(K.S. Radhakrishnan)
                                                                 ………………………..J.
                                          (Pinaki Chandra Ghose)
New Delhi;

September 10, 2013.
  


Can sexual intercourse, consent to which is obtained by making a false promise of marriage, be rape within the meaning of Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ?

Held:
  1. The High Court has gravely erred in fact and in law by reversing the conviction of the accused for the offence of rape and convicting him under Section 376 of the IPC. It is apparent from the evidence on record that the accused had obtained the consent of the prosecutrix for sexual intercourse under a misconception of fact i.e. that he would marry her and thus made her pregnant. He is thus guilty of rape as defined under Section 375 of the IPC and is liable to be punished for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC.
(Para 11)

2.     A woman’s body is not a man’s plaything and he cannot take advantage of it in order to satisfy his lust and desires by fooling a woman into consenting to sexual intercourse simply because he wants to indulge in it. The accused in this case has committed the vile act of rape and deserves to be suitably punished for it.
(Para 13)



IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1949 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.5390 of 2008)

State of U.P                                                                                    . ... Appellant
VS.
Naushad                                                                                        ... Respondent

J U D G M E N T: . Gopala Gowda, J.

1.       Leave granted.

2.       This appeal is directed against the impugned judgment and order dated 16.03.2007, passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No. 4505 of 2005, whereby the High Court allowed the appeal filed by the accused-respondent acquitting him for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (in short IPC) by reversing the judgment and order dated 05.10.2005 of the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Courts 1, Muzzaffarnagar in Sessions Trial No. 377 of 2004 which convicted the accused under Section 376 and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and a fine of 10,000/- and in default of payment of fine further imprisonment for a period of one year.

3.       The brief facts of the case are stated hereunder to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the High Court in reversing the judgment of the trial court. The accused- Naushad is the son of the maternal uncle of the prosecutrix – Shabana’s father - who is the informant. The informant complained that Naushad used to visit their house often and enticed his daughter - Shabana and cheated her, promising to marry her and had regular sexual intercourse with her on this pretext. The informant came to know about this when his daughter narrated to her mother how she was raped and she got pregnant. The complainant along with his wife went to complain to the parents of the accused, Irshad and his wife and told them that their son-Naushad raped their daughter-Shabana by giving a false promise of marriage and she has become pregnant. Irshad and his wife accepted their fault and promised to punish Naushad. A Panchayat was held a day before lodging the report when Irshad and his wife offered 10,000/- to 20,000/- to them and said that they will not marry their son with Shabana. The informant alleged that Irshad and his wife even threatened to kill him if any action is taken. On the basis of this information given by Irshad, case crime no. 115 of 2003 was registered at P.S. Kotwali Nagar in Muzaffar Nagar. After investigation, the Investigating Officer arrested Irshad and Naushad. Shabana was sent for medical examination and the report was submitted by Dr. Abha. After the charge sheet was submitted, the case was committed to the Sessions Court. The Sessions Judge framed charge under Section 376, IPC against Irshad and Section 376 read with Section 109, IPC against Naushad and both were further charged under Section 506, IPC. The Sessions Judge held the accused Naushad guilty of the charge under Section 376 and convicted him, sentencing him to imprisonment for life. Being aggrieved by this, the accused filed an appeal before the High Court. The High Court allowed the appeal and held that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and the order of conviction and sentence of the accused respondent was set aside and he was directed to be released forthwith. Against the reversal of conviction and sentence of the accused by the High Court, the appellant - State has filed the present appeal.

4.       The trial court after examining the evidence on record and hearing the rival legal contentions recorded its findings on the issue as to whether the accused – Naushad is guilty of the offence of rape charged under Section 376 of the IPC. On behalf of the prosecution, P.W.1 Shabana (the prosecutrix), P.W.2 (the complainant) Muzaffar Ali, P.W.3 Dr.Abha Attrey and P.W.4 S.I. Kiran Pal Singh were examined by way of oral evidence in support of the occurrence. P.W.2 has proved the written complaint vide Ex. Ka-1, P.W.3 has proved her medical examination report vide Ex. Ka-2 and P.W.4 has proved the FIR vide Ex. Ka-3, and showing the registration of the case vide Ex.Ka-4, the charge-sheet vide Ex. Ka-8 among other exhibits. The statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. wherein he has stated that he used to visit the house of the complainant but he denied any illicit relations with Shabana. He stated that there was a rumour in the village about her becoming pregnant and the complainant made a proposal to arrange his marriage with Shabana but the members of his family refused to the proposal on the ground that Shabana was of ‘bad character’. The accused alleged that the complainant filed a false complaint and the witnesses have made false depositions and the case has been filed in order to pressurise him. The accused produced no evidence to prove his defence. P.W.1 the prosecutrix-Shabana was examined by the prosecution and deposed on solemn affirmation that “Irshad is related to me like Dada (like grandfather). He is the maternal uncle of my father and the accused Naushad is the son of Irshad. The incident dates back to about two years or quarter past two years. The accused Naushad used to often visit my house and sometimes used to sleep at night in my house itself. At that time, my age was about 15 years. Naushad used to say to me, I shall marry you and then he forcibly used to commit rape on me and might have forcibly committed rape on me 15 or 20 times in a year and he continued inciting and misguiding me. I became pregnant as a result of this and when I asked him to marry me, he refused to do so. … Even in the Panchayat, Naushad refused to marry me. Irshad offered 20,000/- and refused to arrange marriage of his son with me”. She also stated that thereafter a daughter was born to her and it was the result of the accused leaving her pregnant.

          Further, P.W.2-Muzaffar Ali, while making his deposition on solemn affirmation has stated that “Accused Irshad is related to me as my real maternal uncle and accused Naushad is his son. About one and a half years ago, I lodged the (F.I.) Report of the occurrence. At that time the age of Shabana was about 16 years. Naushad used to visit my house prior to one and a half years, and sometimes he used to stay at night in my house. He might have stayed at night in my house several times. Ten days prior to lodging the (F.I.) Report, Shabana conveyed that Naushad had committed rape on her as a result of which she had become pregnant. I talked to my maternal uncle (Irshad) about this matter, he asked me to wait for sometime and thereafter “Nikah” (contract-marriage) will be got arranged. But two or four days thereafter, Irshad stated that “Nikah” is not possible. You may accept ten to twenty thousands rupees and threatened if a Report of the case was made, he (Irshad) would kill him (Muzaffar Ali). Thereafter, whatever was conveyed by my daughter was got type written in a form of complaint and then the same was lodged at the Police Station. After lodging the (F.I.) Report, a baby/daughter was born to Shabana, which might be aged about 8 months now. Thereafter, a Panchayat was held in the village. Even in the Panchayat, Irshad refused to arrange “Nikah” of his son (accused Naushad) with my daughter Shabana.”

5.       After hearing the arguments advanced by the learned counsel on behalf of the parties, the trial court came to the conclusion that in the circumstances narrated by the witnesses of the prosecution and the evidence on record the charge levelled against accused- Naushad under Section 376 of the IPC stands proved. Vide order dated 05.10.2005 of the Session’s Judge, the accused was convicted of the offence of rape under Section 376 of the IPC on the ground that the consent given by P.W.1 Shabana was not consent for sexual intercourse in the eyes of law. She had given consent on the ground that the accused had promised to marry her and thus this consent was obtained by misconception of fact and therefore the case is covered under section 376 of the IPC. The trial court held that as the facts of this case are of a very grave nature, the accused was awarded maximum sentence of life imprisonment and further stated that the victim and the accused are related to each other and the accused took undue advantage of the victim due to this relationship by keeping her under the misconception that he would marry her and committed rape on her as a result of which she became pregnant and later on gave birth to a baby daughter. In view of the circumstances, the trial court awarded sentence of life imprisonment for the accused and to pay a fine of 10,000/-. 

6.       Against this judgment and order of the trial court the accused filed an appeal in the High Court urging various grounds in support of his prayer. On re-appreciation of the evidence of record, the High Court has held that there is no material on record to show that the accused had committed forcible sexual intercourse and that the prosecutrix resisted it. The High Court stated that she has admitted the presence of her grandmother and younger sister in the room where the accused used to commit sexual intercourse but she never raised an alarm at that time or thereafter. The High Court further stated that it was also very surprising that she never objected to the accused sleeping in her room even though she claimed that he used to commit forcible sexual intercourse. The High Court has held that circumstances clearly show that she was a consenting party to the act of the accused and the allegation of forcible sexual intercourse as alleged cannot be accepted. Further, the High Court stated that even if it is accepted that she consented for sexual intercourse on account of misconception of fact that the accused had promised to marry her, it will not give rise to an inference beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had no intention to marry her at all from the inception and that the promise he made was false to his knowledge. The High Court, citing the case of Deelip Singh @ Dilip Singh v. State of Bihar (2005) 1 SCC 88 , has held that it could be a breach of promise to marry rather than false promise to marry and there is nothing on record to indicate that she was incapable of understanding the nature and implication of the act of the accused for which she consented to. The High Court thus allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and order dated 05.10.2005 of the trial court convicting and sentencing the accused, on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and held that the trial court has erroneously convicted the accused. The accused was acquitted of the charge under Section 376 of the IPC and was directed to be released from jail.

7.       Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment and order of the High Court, the appellant- State of Uttar Pradesh has filed this appeal before this Court.

          The learned senior counsel for the appellant- State, Mr. Ratnakar Dash has contended that the accused promised the prosecutrix - Shabana that he would marry her and then had sexual intercourse with her even though he knew from the inception that he had no intention of marrying her and that the High Court erred in holding that the victim was a consenting party and that even if the victim consented to sexual intercourse, it was not free consent but was given on the pretext of a false promise made by the accused to marry her. Thus, the accused committed rape on the victim. He further contended that in such type of case, the trial court has rightly observed that the evidence of the victim is comparatively more important and credible. He stated that the accused clearly practised deception on the victim in order to indulge in sexual intercourse with her and the trial court rightly convicted the accused of rape and sentenced him to life imprisonment due to the gravity of the offence.

8.      Mr. Pranab Kumar Mullick, learned counsel on behalf of the respondent contended that no time of committing rape has been mentioned in the FIR and hence, the entire prosecution story is doubtful and also as per the FIR, the victim narrated her story to her mother but it is silent about the manner in which her father came to know about the incident. It was further contended that the age of the victim was 19 years and at the time of the occurrence, her age was not less than 16 years. It was further contended that the victim was of little intelligence but no such evidence is available on file. Also, admittedly, other family members used to sleep in the room and no hue and cry was made at the time of intercourse and hence, it was intercourse with consent and not rape. It was contended that the High Court rightly reversed the conviction of the trial court and acquitted the accused of the charge of rape.

9.       We have heard the rival legal contentions and perused the evidence on record. The following issues arise for our consideration:

(i)                 Whether the High Court has rightly reversed the conviction and sentence of the accused for the offence of rape punishable under Section 376 of the IPC?

(ii)              Whether the trial court was correct in convicting the accused for the offence of rape punishable under Section 376 of the IPC by holding that the victim did not give her free consent to the act of sexual intercourse but it was consent given under misconception of  fact?

(iii)            Whether the trial court was right in holding that the crime was of a very grave nature and was thus justified in sentencing the accused to the maximum punishment of life imprisonment as provided for under Section 376 of the IPC?

10.   We will answer point nos. 1 and 2 together as they are related to each other. Section 376 of IPC prescribes the punishment for the offence of rape. Section 375 of the IPC defines the offence of rape, and enumerates six descriptions of the offence. The description “secondly” speaks of rape “without her consent”. Thus, sexual intercourse by a man with a woman without her consent will constitute the offence of rape. We have to examine as to whether in the present case, the accused is guilty of the act of sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix ‘against her consent’. The prosecutrix in this case has deposed on record that the accused promised marriage with her and had sexual intercourse with her on this pretext and when she got pregnant, his family refused to marry him with her on the ground that she is of ‘bad character’.

                 How is ‘consent’ defined? Section 90 of the IPC defines consent known to be given under ‘fear or misconception’ which reads as under:-

90. Consent known to be given under fear or misconception – A consent is not such consent as it intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; xxxx” 

Thus, if consent is given by the prosecutrix under a misconception of fact, it is vitiated. In the present case, the accused had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix by giving false assurance to the prosecutrix that he would marry her. After she got pregnant, he refused to do so. From this, it is evident that he never intended to marry her and procured her consent only for the reason of having sexual relations with her, which act of the accused falls squarely under the definition of rape as he had sexual intercourse with her consent which was consent obtained under a misconception of fact as defined under Section 90 of the IPC. Thus, the alleged consent said to have obtained by the accused was not voluntary consent and this Court is of the view that the accused indulged in sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix by misconstruing to her his true intentions. It is apparent from the evidence that the accused only wanted to indulge in sexual intercourse with her and was under no intention of actually marrying the prosecutrix. He made a false promise to her and he never aimed to marry her. In the case of Yedla Srinivas Rao v. State of A.P. (2006) 11 SCC 615, with reference to similar facts, this Court in para 10 held as under:-

“10. It appears that the intention of the accused as per the testimony of PW1 was, right from the beginning, not honest and he kept on promising that he will marry her, till she became pregnant. This kind of consent obtained by the accused cannot be said to be any consent because she was under a misconception of fact that the accused intends to marry her, therefore, she had submitted to sexual intercourse with him. This fact is also admitted by the accused that he had committed sexual intercourse which is apparent from the testimony of PWs 1, 2 and 3 and before Panchayat of elders of the village. It is more than clear that the accused made a false promise that he would marry her. Therefore, the intention of the accused right from the beginning was not bona fide and the poor girl submitted to the lust of the accused completely being misled by the accused who held out the promise for marriage. This kind of consent taken by the accused with clear intention not to fulfil the promise and persuaded the girl to believe that he is going to marry her and obtained her consent for the sexual intercourse under total misconception, cannot be treated to be a consent.”

Further, in para 17 of the said judgment, this Court held that:-

“In the present case in view of the facts as mentioned above we are satisfied that the consent which had been obtained by the accused was not a voluntary one which was given by her under misconception of fact that the accused would marry her but this is not a consent in law. This is more evident from the testimony of PW1 as well as PW6 who was functioning as Panchayat where the accused admitted that he had committed sexual intercourse and promised to marry her but he absconded despite the promise made before the Panchayat. That shows that the accused had no intention to marry her right from the beginning and committed sexual intercourse totally under the misconception of fact by prosecutor that he would marry her.”

Thus, this Court held that the accused in that case was guilty of the offence of rape as he had obtained the consent of the prosecutrix fraudulently, under a misconception of fact.

11.    The High Court has gravely erred in fact and in law by reversing the conviction of the accused for the offence of rape and convicting him under Section 376 of the IPC. It is apparent from the evidence on record that the accused had obtained the consent of the prosecutrix for sexual intercourse under a misconception of fact i.e. that he would marry her and thus made her pregnant. He is thus guilty of rape as defined under Section 375 of the IPC and is liable to be punished for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC. The trial court was absolutely correct in appreciating the evidence on record and convicting and sentencing the accused for the offence of rape by holding that the accused had obtained the consent of the prosecutrix under a misconception of fact and this act of his amounts to an offence as the alleged consent is on the basis of misconception, and the accused raped the prosecutrix. He brazenly raped her for two years or more giving her the false assurance that he would marry her, and as a consequence she became pregnant. For the reasons stated supra, we have to uphold the judgment and order of the trial court in convicting and sentencing the accused for the offence of rape, by reversing the judgment and order of the High Court. We find the accused-respondent guilty of the offence of rape as defined under Section 375 of the IPC.

12.   The answer to point no.3 is pertaining to the question of sentence awarded by the trial court to the accused. The trial court has justified in awarding of maximum sentence of life imprisonment to the accused under Section 376 of the IPC on the ground that the facts of this case are of a very grave nature. The accused being related to the prosecution used to often visit her house and took undue advantage of this relationship and kept the prosecutrix under the misconception that he would marry her and committed rape on her for more than two years thereby making her pregnant. In such circumstances, the trial court held that it would be justifiable to award the maximum sentence to the accused. We, therefore, hold that the trial court was correct in awarding the maximum sentence of life imprisonment to the accused as he has committed a breach of the trust that the prosecutrix had in him, especially due to the fact that they were related to each other. He thus invaded her person, by indulging in sexual intercourse with her, in order to appease his lust, all the time knowing that he would not marry her. He committed an act of brazen fraud leading her to believe that he would marry her.

13.   A woman’s body is not a man’s plaything and he cannot take advantage of it in order to satisfy his lust and desires by fooling a woman into consenting to sexual intercourse simply because he wants to indulge in it. The accused in this case has committed the vile act of rape and deserves to be suitably punished for it.

14.   In view of the foregoing reasons, this appeal is allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court is set aside and the conviction and sentencing of the accused by the trial court under Section 376 of the IPC is upheld. The accused-respondent is found guilty of the offence of rape as defined under Section 375 of the IPC and is sentenced to imprisonment for life under Section 376 of the IPC. The accused-respondent is directed to surrender before the trial court within four weeks.


………………………………………………………………………J.
[SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA]
………………………………………………………………………J.
[V. GOPALA GOWDA]
New Delhi,

November 19, 2013